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Editorial

In the third week of June 2000 a meeting was held in Utrecht in preparation of an English-language History of Christianity in Indonesia (HCI). This project is the initiative of Dr K. Steenbrink (IIMO, Utrecht), who has brought together a team of scholars from Indonesia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Germany and the USA. Most of them assembled in Utrecht from 19-23 June to present their contribution to the planned volume for discussion. Among the participants were Dr Jan S. Artonang from the United Theological College (STT), Jakarta, Dr Azyumardi Azra, Professor of history and Rector of the *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (State Institute for Islamic Studies) in Jakarta, Dr Simon Rae, Principal of Knox College, University of Dunedin, New Zealand, Dr Rita Smith Kipp, Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, and Dr Fridolin Ukur, Dayak historian and poet. With such a cast, it is obvious that the papers presented and the discussion they elicited offered a wider view than is found in conventional mission history. We are happy that a number of those present gave permission to publish their texts in our Journal.

Dr Azyumardi's paper, using non-Western sources, discusses the Schrieke theory that the crusade mentality which the Portuguese brought to Southeast Asia instigated a "race" between Islam and Christianity and caused polarization between the two religions. Simon Rae attempts to examine the phenomenon of religious change among the Karo Batak of North Sumatra in the framework of social change in their environment. Rita Smith-Kipp challenges the allegation that in colonial times Christians identified with the occupying power rather than with their non-Christian compatriots and did not join the struggle for independence. On the contrary, the nationalist struggle required them to rethink what being a Christian meant and what religion has to do with national and cultural identities. Th. van den End examines the distinctive features of the nineteenth century as a category in Indonesian religious history, pointing to changes in the West as well as in the Indonesian world.

Besides the project 'History of Christianity in Indonesia', several other activities are going on in the field of the history of Dutch missions and overseas churches. We report on these in the last part of this issue.

The editors hope that in coming years scholars from outside the Netherlands will continue to contribute to our Journal. In this way its scope will be broadened and its contents be even more varied.

“*Bangsa goes above agama*”.
The Nationalist Credentials of Christian Indonesians

Rita Smith Kipp

In the decades preceding Indonesia's revolution for independence, both Muslim nationalist leaders and common folk often expressed the suspicion that Indonesian Christians felt a natural sympathy for the Dutch and thus were a brake on the cause of nationalism.¹ I have heard similar accusations from Indonesians recalling the revolutionary era. In the mid-1960s, writing an essay about toleration, Benedict Anderson observed that Javanese Christians were regarded as something less than Javanese, and that “even Javanese Catholics, do not really belong to the Javanese family in the fullest sense.”² These suspicions, that Christian Indonesians are not loyal to the nation or not genuine members of their ethnic group, resemble some scholarly interpretations that view the missionary enterprise as one part of a divide and rule strategy by which colonial powers attempted to win the loyalty of certain groups and to mitigate the spread of native resistance based on religious solidarity.³ Since independence, church historians have tried to counter this interpretation by asserting the nationalistic credentials of the Indonesian Christian community.⁴ At the same time, a state-propagated ideology, Pancasila, aimed to cultivate religious tolerance in the world's largest Muslim populace and to encourage citizens to imagine a religiously and culturally plural nation. Church burnings and deadly sectarian violence in recent years reveal how ineffective were those decades of systematic Pancasila indoctrination at all levels of education and in the civil service, and show that issues of minorities in the nation remain unresolved. Are Chinese Indonesians less than Indonesian? Are Christians still regarded as traitors to national aspirations of unity? Islamic revival of the late twentieth century has been fueled by opposition to Western cultures and Western power, and Christianity is obviously part of the West's cultural legacy. To what extent does the sectarian violence reflect Muslim

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- 1 For example, Fred von der Mehden, *Religion and nationalism in Southeast Asia*, (University of Wisconsin Press, 1963) 171, 182; Tan Tiat Han, *The attitude of Dutch Protestant missions toward Indonesian nationalism, 1945-49*, (Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1967) 52.
 - 2 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Mythology and the tolerance of the Javanese*, (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1996) 14.
 - 3 On Africa see, for example, Emmanuell A. Ayandele, *The missionary impact on modern Nigeria, 1842-1914*, Longmans, 1971; Nosipho Majake, *The role of missionaries in conquest*, Society of Young Africa, 1952. On Burma see Von der Mehden, *Religion and nationalism*, 191.
 - 4 For example, Zakariah Ngelow, *Kekristenan dan nasionalisme*, (BPK Gunung Mulia, 1994); M.P.M. Muskens (ed.), *Sejarah Gereja Katolik Indonesia*, Arnoldus, 1972-74; W.B. Sidjabat (ed.), *Partisipasi Kristen dalam nation building di Indonesia*, Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1968.

suspicions that Christians are really Europeans manque? Because of these continuing tensions between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, the scholarly exploration of Christians and nationalism, the place of Christians in the nation, remains a cogent and even pressing topic.

I suggest that colonial Christians did not, for the most part, identify with Europeans, but the nationalist struggle required them to think through what being a Christian meant and what religion has to do with national and cultural identities.⁵ Those Christians who joined in support of Indonesia's independence, as most eventually did, came to understand who they were in a new way, conceptualizing their faith as one part or layer of a self composed of many, somewhat separable, parts and layers. Being a Christian, then, was understood as compatible with being Indonesian, just as being Indonesian was understood as compatible with being Javanese. In short, that kind of modern, divided self comprised of multiple identities among which we constantly shift, bringing to the front one or another of our various roles according to different needs and situations, was, for Indonesian Christians, partly a product of conceptualizing their place in the nationalist struggle.

It is important in this argument to understand what motivated nationalist sentiments among Indonesian Christians. I suggest that Christians found the rhetorical arguments about freedom and independence by nationalist leaders persuasive for the same reasons that other Indonesians did: these arguments resonated with their personal experiences of the racial divisions that ordered colonial life. The factor of racism has perhaps received too little emphasis in histories of nationalism in Southeast Asia and in theories of nationalism in the colonial world in general. Certainly, it has received too little attention in church histories. Racial barriers in colonial life belied both the secular ideals of democracy as well as the Christian ideal of a common humanity under God. It was primarily through rejecting racial barriers, I suggest, that Christian Indonesians were motivated to disentangle their Christian faith from their ethnic and national loyalties. These barriers were pervasive in colonial society, scripted in a legal system organized along racial lines, and they were pervasive, as well, in the church communities of the colonial Indies.

The Layered Self

The illusion cradled by Dr. Kuyper that all difficulties would be solved as soon as all nations were Christianized was proved untenable. In the end, when all the chips are down (said Mr. Mulia, a prominent reformed native Christian and representative in the Volksraad), *'Bangsa*

5 For comparison, see S.C. Graaf van Randwijck's discussion of Ambonese and Minahasa Christians in *Handelen en denken in dienst der zending*. (Boekencentrum, 1981) 336-37.

goes above *agama*.’ That is to say, race [or national?] allegiance prevails over religious allegiance.⁶

Tahi Bonar Simatupang served as Chief of Staff of Indonesia’s Armed Forces when he was but a young man and Indonesia was a brand new country. Years later, he chaired the National Council of Churches in Indonesia and served on the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches. In his memoir he describes himself by using a metaphor of layers, as if the experiences of his life had laid down different sediments in his being. Although he had left his Batak homeland in Sumatra when still a teenager, and although he only rarely thought about being Batak, he regarded that layer, the ethnic sedimentation, as his most “basic.” Dutch-language education had laid down yet another stratum, he recounted, one that had contributed to his embracing the idea of the Indonesian nation and the values of modernity. As part of the Republican army that fought the Dutch for Indonesia’s independence, he was a committed nationalist. Yet another layer of his being – his Christianity – occupied a unique position:

The layer of nationalism, which started to develop in my heart in my first seventeen years, did not eliminate the layers of the Batak personality and the Dutch education. The layer of Christianity as part of my personality does not have the same position as the other layers. Instead of existing beside the others, the layer of Christianity infiltrates them as the “salt” and the “light” that put problems and issues of the pre-end era (the past and the present) in light of the end (the future).⁷

In short, the layers metaphor seemed *not* to fit his faith, which appeared to him to seep into all the other layers, conditioning his perspective of an end/future and thus affecting every other aspect of himself in the present. This is an insider’s view of faith. From an outsider’s perspective, however, religious differences are apparent only at the surface, so Simatupang’s Christianity, like his being a Batak and his nationalism, appeared to others as just another aspect of a complex, multidimensional person.

Like Simatupang, Gunung Mulia was also a Toba Batak whose life spanned the transition from the colonial Dutch East Indies to the independent Republic of Indonesia. Mulia, too, served in public office at the national level. Quoted above in the epigram to the effect that race or nationality (*bangsa*) goes *above* common religious identity (*agama*), Mulia conveyed through that imagery, not a layering of identities in chronological sequence, but rather his sense of political priorities. Schmutzer quotes Mulia to disprove the presumption of Holland’s turn-of-the-century Christian Right that Christian Indonesians would necessarily stand as Dutch allies. Mulia implies, rather, that his race or nationality is more basic than his religious identity, at least in the context of

6 Eduard J. M. Schmutzer, *Dutch colonial policy and the search for identity in Indonesia, 1920-31*, (E.J. Brill, 1977) 85. The question in brackets is mine.

7 Tahi Bonar Simatupang, *The fallacy of a myth*, (Sinar Harapan, 1996) 37.

imagining Indonesian independence. He and other Christians would side with fellow Indonesians rather than with the Dutch as fellow Christians.

As Bataks living in Java, both these men would have encountered the prejudices that adhere to the Batak label, an epithet associated historically with cannibalism and crudeness.⁸ As Christians in a country almost ninety percent Muslim, they were thereby doubly different from their Javanese neighbors and colleagues. Nonetheless, Simatupang dismissed both ethnic and religious prejudice in his memoir. At a meeting of the World Council of Churches in Singapore, Simatupang once objected to someone's use of the phrase "minority community" to describe Indonesian Christians. "We in Indonesia do not consider ourselves a minority," he insisted. Similarly, he wrote about the heady days of the revolution: "I am not a Javanese; I am an Indonesian born in Tapanuli. Nonetheless, in all my wandering around Java during this war of Independence, I never once felt like a stranger."⁹

When Simatupang wrote these memoirs, intolerance and prejudice were not issues that Indonesians could easily discuss in public. For almost two decades the New Order maintained an injunction against public discussion of politically volatile topics coded with the acronym SARA, standing for ethnic group (*suku*), religion (*agama*), race (*ras*), and class/group relations (*antar golongan*). The social fault lines or tensions that SARA indexes betray the national ideals of unity and harmony, values that many Indonesians share. People sometimes did not *wish* to talk about or admit social tensions around ethnicity and religion, their reticence fully coincident with the government's injunction. But if minorityhood was such a non-issue, why would the government wish to suppress discussion of it? Furthermore, Simatupang's memoir reveals elsewhere the fact that our ethnic and religious identities are never solely ours to claim or reject unilaterally; we have to live also with how others define and think of us. Simatupang spent three-quarters of his life in Java, married a Javanese woman and raised all his children there, yet admitted that, even so, "people think of me as Sumatranese."¹⁰ No doubt his minority status as a Christian was also important in how most Javanese thought about him, regardless of whether he liked the implications of the term "minority."

The multiple identities of people who live in diverse, complex societies do not always conflict. Most of the time, we move deftly in and out of different roles without experiencing doubt or having to make decisions about whether one is more important than another. The rising tide of nationalism in twentieth century Indonesia, however, forced Christians to examine once again what being a

8 Rita Smith Kipp, *Dissociated identities: Ethnicity, religion, and class in an Indonesian society*, (University of Michigan Press, 1993) 24-32.

9 Tahi Bonar Simatupang, *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's War*, (MIP Translation Series, # 55) 89.

10 Simatupang, *The fallacy of a myth*, 26.

Christian meant. Did it mean that one had to support a colonial state controlled by fellow Christians? In deciding that they could support the revolution, Christians came to imagine the new nation as secular, a realm in which *bangsa* and *agama* could vary independently of each other. That is, they could unite with other Indonesians as Indonesians, even if they stood apart from them in religious convictions. The question here is, how did this happen? Why did many Christians begin to parse their religious identity and their political identity into separate layers in this way? What were the social or cultural forces that encouraged Indonesian Christians to become nationalists, particularly secular nationalists, imagining the nation as a community in which one's religious faith was not relevant to citizenship?

Race as an Organizing Principle in the Dutch East Indies

Whether within or outside Christendom, colonial Indonesians lived in a society organized along racial lines. The contradiction between caste-like racial barriers on the one hand and Western ideals such as achievement based on education and merit, self-determination, democracy, and brotherhood (whether conceptualized humanistically or religiously) is central to understanding the social force of nationalism in the colonial world.¹¹ "Race," as I use it here, denotes only a socially constructed reality, but one that powerfully shapes societies in different ways. The social realities of race in the Dutch East Indies were constructed differently throughout the colonial period. The general pattern of this change is that a legal and social order in which religious differences intercut racial differences gave way gradually to one based increasingly on race alone. The rise of nationalism in the early twentieth century occurred during a period when the racial lines between Europeans and native Indonesians had grown increasingly sharp.

In the VOC era, a dualistic religious distinction between Reformed Christianity and all other faiths influenced the legal position of Native Christians or those of other Asian origins. Asian Christians were subject in principle to the same laws and legal procedures that applied to Europeans. "From the first, religion and culture were understood as inseparable; hence the efforts made to associate Christian Asians with the Dutch."¹² Especially, Christianity was a sign of political allegiance to the Dutch. Furthermore, Christians enjoyed certain

11 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia" in *Government and politics of Southeast Asia*, second edition. George Kahin (ed.), (Cornell University Press, 1964) 181-278.

12 Jean Gelman Taylor, *The social world of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia*, (University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 47. See also William Edward van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling van de staatsrechtelijke indeeling der bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indië*, (Veenman and Zonen, 1934) 15.

advantages in the ethnically heterogeneous world of old Batavia. Christians could not be sold into slavery for debt, Christian slaves could not be sold to non-Christian owners, and slave mothers of Christian children became free when their husbands died. The Company maintained an orphanage for the children of Christians, and provided credit more readily to Christians. Finally, legal marriage to a Dutch man was precluded for any native or other Asian woman who was not a Christian.¹³

Social life was always more fluid than the legal categories, but it took shape along racial and ethnic lines more often than religious ones. Christians were not always treated as Europeans, even by the law. As Jean Gelman Taylor put it, “While religion was a unifying bond, Asian and part-Asian ranked lower socially.”¹⁴ According to Van Mastenbroek, the relevant social categories in the seventeenth century were European, Christian Native, Chinese, and Muslim or other non-Christians, showing the way the Christian/non Christian distinction intersected with other bases of differentiation. The different wards of the city also reflected these religious/ethnic distinctions. *Mardijkers*, Portuguese-speaking Christians from coastal India and elsewhere, made up the second largest ethnic group after the Chinese and were required to live in a specific section of the city. They remained a visibly separate community throughout most of the VOC era. Many of these men served as soldiers; others were small shopkeepers or farmers. The “European” section of Batavia was inherently mixed in a racial sense. There were relatively few Dutch or European women, and Javanese were forbidden to live within Batavia, so European men married or lived with Balinese slave women or women from elsewhere in Asia. If married to Europeans, such women became, in a legal sense, “European,” but not fully so: they were not allowed to repatriate to the Netherlands with their husbands unless those men were of very high rank in the Company.

A distinctive Mestizo culture thus developed in old Batavia in which the *lingua francas* were Portuguese and Malay, not Dutch, and in which standards of etiquette and public behavior were quite different from those in the Netherlands of that period. Elaborate sumptuary rules signaled rank (not race), reserving such items as pearls and carriages for the families of men in the very highest VOC offices. The privilege of employing Europeans as coachmen was also restricted by these rules for a time. “A curious side-light, this, on the eighteenth-century view of race and status, for it set service by a European above that of a slave, and that service was often to non-Europeans.”¹⁵ Boys born into high-ranking VOC families were sent back the Netherlands for education, a prerequisite for any of the higher VOC posts, while Mestiza girls

13 Van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling*, 21; Leonard Blussé, *Strange company: Chinese settlers, Mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*, Verh. KITLV 122, 1988.

14 Taylor, *The social world*, 28; See also Van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling*, 45.

15 Taylor, *The social world*, 67.

of such families were matched with Dutch men immigrating from Holland. By the eighteenth century, posts above the level of assistant were increasingly limited by law to men born in Holland. It is no wonder that the ruling elite was “preoccupied” by the definition of “European.”¹⁶

The Napoleonic and then the British periods of rule, following fast on the demise of the VOC, brought rapid social change to Batavia during the early nineteenth century. Daendels made Christian military officers the equal of European ones, and recruited and trained 150 Christian Ambonese as military leaders. He urged that native Christian soldiers live with the European soldiers and be treated as they were.¹⁷ In contrast, Raffles tended to use religion less often as a significant principle of categorizing the populace, and the racial factor gained in importance commensurate with this shift. In the early nineteenth century, Mestizo culture came under assault first from British civil servants who increasingly arrived in the Indies with their wives, and who viewed the racially mixed community of Batavia’s elite with disdain. While no Europeans arrived in Batavia at all between 1808 and 1811 due to the disruptions of war, hundreds arrived suddenly with the British interregnum, and were shocked to find that elite Mestizas sat on the floor and chewed betel. Van Mastenbroek judges that the British operated with a dichotomous European/Native distinction, and tended to put part-Asians with the Natives. The Dutch civil servants who came to the Indies after the British were similar in bringing along their wives, and a veritable “crusade” against Mestizo manners was launched. These new civil servants expected more often to retire to the Netherlands than to remain in the Indies, as many Company men who had married locally had chosen to do. But should they marry Mestiza or native women in the Indies, now they were able to take their wives and children back with them. In this period, the racial prerequisites for office were strengthened. After 1825 all positions were reserved to men born and educated in the Netherlands.¹⁸ A regulation of 1836 specified that those born in the Indies and part-Asians might hold positions no higher than commissary and inspector 3rd class. In 1864 these racial limitations, and a controversial requirement for a diploma from the Delft Academy, were dropped, but posts in the civil service were to be filled exclusively by those who passed two qualifying examinations. Since Indonesia’s first high school opened only in 1860, the top positions remained almost exclusively in the hands of Dutch men.

A major codification and revision of the laws occurred in 1848 which classified citizens into a fourfold scheme: Europeans and those equated with Europeans; Natives and those equated with Natives. In other words, this was basically a dualistic system. Article 3 of the new 1848 codification clarified explicitly that

16 *Ibidem*, 76, 85.

17 Van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling*, 48.

18 Taylor, *The social world*, 118.

Native Christians were still bound to uphold local customary laws and they remained under the authority of local indigenous leaders.¹⁹ The *Regeeringsreglement* (R.r.) of 1854 reinforced and clarified this in its Article 109, where it is obvious, too, that religious differences still entered into the equation, but only *after* the major division of Native/European:

With Europeans are equated all Christians and all persons not falling within the terms of the following passage.

With natives are equated Arabs, Moors, Chinese, and all who are Mohammedan or heathen.²⁰

Europeans in the Indies were under constitutional protections and a legal system that was as close as possible to that which protected citizens in Holland; Natives were under different constitutional and legal systems. Two kinds of courts operated – a *Landraad*, where native cases were adjudicated, and the *Raad van Justitie*, which heard the cases of Europeans.²¹ “Defendants tried in the European court were protected by the provisions of the European criminal code with respect to arbitrary arrest and jail conditions, and they faced a legally qualified tribunal, whereas trials in the native courts were conducted under the *Indisch Reglement* where only the presiding chairman was legally qualified.”²² In some instances, though, Native Christians were tried in these European courts. During the British interregnum, Cheribon Christians were sent to Batavia rather than be judged in local courts.²³

The legal status of Christians became an emotional political cause in the Netherlands around the turn of the twentieth century as the Christian Right argued that making Native Christians subject to local laws put them under the thumb of Muslim leaders who would not exempt them from contributions to feast days or who required them to perform corvee labor on Sundays. Who should adjudicate disputes involving Christians, and how should Christian marriages receive legal sanction? The Christian right in the Netherlands feared that the ambiguous legal status of Native Christians was becoming an impediment to further conversion. Liberal Protestants and the liberal missionary organizations, however, wanted Native Christians to remain integrated in their local communities and feared that their legal equation with Europeans would only further isolate them from non-Christian kin and neighbors.²⁴

19 L.W.C. van den Berg, “De rechtstoestand der Inlandsche Christenen in Nederlandsch-Indië en de bezwaren daaruit voor de zending voortvloeiende”, *Orgaan NZV* 39 (1899) 85-100.

20 R.r. Article 109, cited in Van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling*, 107.

21 G. André de la Porte, *Recht en rechtsbedeeling in Nederlandsch-Indië*, Belinfante, 1926.

22 Charles A. Coppel, “The Indonesian Chinese as ‘Foreign Orientals’ in the Netherlands Indies” in *Indonesia: Law and society*. Timothy Lindsey (ed.), (The Federation Press, 1999) 35.

23 Van Mastenbroek, *De historische ontwikkeling*, 49, 54-55.

24 Van Randwijck, *Handelen en denken*.

The situation of the Christian minority was soon eclipsed by the larger issue of whether the Indies should have a single legal system, as was the case in Holland, or a pluralistic one organized along racial categories. Proposals for legal unification were defeated in the Parliament, primarily because of the practical stumbling block that providing enough qualified judges would have been prohibitively expensive, if not impossible.²⁵ Aside from this, many opposed unification on principle. The author of the recodification of 1848, Paul Scholten van Oud Haarlem, had advised that imposing foreign laws on the Natives would provoke a strong reaction.²⁶ Like him, many other Hollanders through the years had argued that the best policy was to interfere as little as possible in the cultural and social aspects of Native life.

The movement for legal unification was finally undone by the growing persuasiveness of those championing the study and preservation of customary or *adat* law. Cornelis van Vollenhoven spearheaded an ambitious investigation and documentation of *adat* law throughout the archipelago. He was unmoved by those who felt that Native Christians merited a special legal place, arguing that religious differences could not and should not be the basis of different legal systems.²⁷ Van Vollenhoven wrote about the “discovery” of *adat* law, although the principle of allowing Natives and others to follow customary laws had in fact existed in practice since the VOC era and had been reinforced by the legal revisions of the mid-nineteenth century. What was new was Van Vollenhoven’s concern to codify largely oral traditions. Van Vollenhoven’s *adat* law project has been judged critically by contemporary scholars who suggest that the privileging of *adat* law diminished the Islamic legal framework of the majority, and promoted a divide and rule policy. Furthermore, by codifying and inscribing what had always been naturally fluid, the *adat* law studies became a conservative force rather than one capable of responding to change.²⁸

Legal revisions of the early twentieth century changed the relevant social categories once more. The phrase denoting “those equated to” Europeans and Natives was eliminated, and what was formerly a dualistic and fourfold system became a tripartite one: Europeans, Foreign Orientals, and Natives. With this the Chinese, who had formerly been among those legally equated to Natives, became a third category between the old dualistic divide. Although religion

25 Copple, “The Indonesian Chinese”.

26 Mahadi, “Islam and law in Indonesia” in *Indonesian religions in transition*. Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers (eds.), (University of Arizona Press, 1987) 211-220.

27 Cornelis van Vollenhoven, *Staatsrecht overzee*, Stenfort Kroese, 1934; *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian adat law: Selections from het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië*, (Volume I, 1918; Volume II, 1931). J.F. Holleman (ed.), M. Nijhoff, 1981.

28 Roy F. Ellen, “The development of anthropology and colonial policy in the Netherlands: 1800-1960”, *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 12:318; Frances Gouda, *Dutch culture overseas: Colonial practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942*, (Amsterdam University Press, 1995) 62; Mahadi, “Islam and law in Indonesia”.

remained mostly irrelevant to this new structure, the categories were also not purely racial in a conceptual sense, because Japanese were included in the category European. This had come about in 1899 as a political concession around trade issues. There were relatively few Japanese in the Indies at that time, but their inclusion in the European category raised objections from the Chinese and other Indonesians that continued throughout the coming decades. At least one scholar objected also on rational grounds: including Japanese as Europeans “robbed article 109 of its meaning.”²⁹

The language of the nineteenth and twentieth century legislation and the writings about it are peppered with the word *gelijkgesteld* (made equal to) reflecting the attempts to give legal precision to categories that were never pure in any case and were continually confounded by the messy realities of life. Whether one was “European” was a question most acute, perhaps, for the many Indo-European, some of whom had received Western educations and had been raised in a Dutch-speaking environment, and others whose families had become dissolved (*opgelost*) into the native population. As the special position for Japanese suggests, who was legally a “European” had almost as much to do with wealth and politics as it did with one’s parentage or ancestry. After 1871 persons could be *gelijkgesteld* with Europeans by decree of the Governor General, notice of which appeared in print in the *Staatsblad*. These became known, then, as *Staatsblad* Europeans, and at least among the Chinese community, as “one-fifty Dutch,” one-fifty indicating the price of the stamp to mail the request.³⁰

The numbers who chose to become *gelijkgesteld* varied yearly from several to hundreds, and the basis of their becoming “European” shifted with the political winds.³¹ In truth, it was difficult to find a consistent, “precise and sharp criterium” to rationalize this change of status. In the middle nineteenth century, some weight was given to a Christian identity, but later the determinations had more to do with education and “suitability for European society.” In 1871, the significant criteria were speaking Dutch, wearing Western clothing, employment and manners, as well as the Christian religion. The use of a family name was added in 1888.³² After 1906, there was a move to do away with this process and substitute naturalization for it, but it remained in effect nonetheless, and legislation of 1919 extended European status automatically to the wives and children of men who had been *gelijkgesteld*. By that time, religious criteria

29 W.F. Prins, “De bevolkingsgroepen in het Nederlandsch-Indische recht”, *Koloniale Studien* 17, 2: 679.

30 H. Schijf and B.A.M. The, “Chinese doctors in the Dutch East Indies: Social mobility among an ethnic trading minority in a colonial society”, *Indonesia* 53: 36.

31 Ph. Kleintjes, *Staatsinstellingen van Nederlandsche-Indië*, (Amsterdam, H. de Bussy, 1927) 102.

32 Jan de Louter, *Handleiding tot de kennis van de staats- en adminsitratief recht van Nederlands-Indië*, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1904) 126, 102.

were dropped entirely, as was (in theory?) the candidate's suitability for European society. Merely the legal needs of the person were considered pertinent to the request.³³

In addition to Chinese who opted to be legally equated with Europeans, Christian Indonesians were apparently more likely than other Indonesians to do so.³⁴ Schijf and The assert that not many Chinese took advantage of the possibility, perhaps some 3000 before 1930, yet of the 19 doctors they interviewed, half had been *gelijkgesteld*. Those who worked for the government were especially likely to have sought this status because "the disadvantages in position and payment of not obtaining equal rights for them were quite considerable."³⁵ After 1913, non-Europeans were eligible for nearly all offices in the administration and army, except the highest position of Governor General, and remuneration in all positions was not supposed to be affected by race. In 1926, however, civil service positions were categorized anew in three levels, and if non-Europeans comprised the majority in a particular level, then it was "Indianized," i.e., reduced to the lowest of the three income levels.³⁶ Gender always confounded these racial categories, of course. Women's inequality before the law is revealed by the fact that they were not able to request *gelijkstelling* on their own but were automatically *gelijkgesteld* to their husband's category. Native women married to Dutch men were thus made equal to Europeans, and European women who married Indonesian or Chinese men lost their Dutch citizenship.³⁷

The Dutch colonials in the East Indies vacillated through time between the values of protecting native society from disruption and of introducing economic and social changes in the name of progress.³⁸ This dilemma – pitting the merits of universalism against those of particularism – has no easy solution. Thus, the desire for legal unification, which was wedded to a commitment to assimilation, can either be read as admirably humanitarian, a means of deracializing society, or can look like arrogance and cultural imperialism. Van Randwijck refers to an influential speech by L.C.W. van den Berg before the *Nederlandse Zendingen Vereniging* that put the legal equation of Natives with Europeans as a form of assimilation, his ideas similar to the liberals of that so-called Ethical Policy era, who favored "association" between Europeans and educated Natives. Van den Berg envisioned a day when elite Christian Indonesians, at least, would worship

33 Kleintjes, *Staatsinstellingen*, 101, 102.

34 Kleintjes, *Staatsinstellingen*.

35 Schijf and The, "Chinese doctors," 36.

36 C. Fasseur, "Cornerstone and stumbling block: Racial classification and the late colonial state in Indonesia" in *The late colonial state in Indonesia: Political and economic foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942*, Robert Cribb (ed.), (Verh. KITLV 163) 42.

37 De Louter, *Handleiding tot de kennis*, 124.

38 J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, (Prentice-Hall, 1964) 84-5; Justus M. van der Kroef, *The dialectic of colonial Indonesian history*, Van der Peet, 1963; Schmutzer, *The Dutch colonial policy*.

in the same churches with Europeans of their class.³⁹ Conversely, a legal system fractured into different *adat* traditions, even if predicated on a racial divide, appears tolerant and relativistic from the particularist angle but inequitable and conservative from a universalistic one. Other colonial rulers faced the same conundrum. The British in India did not resort to *adat* law for the Natives as the Dutch had done, but fell back instead on the criterion of converts' former religion as a basis for their legal positions. Thus, Christian converts were protected from the civil death that would have made them non-persons and ineligible to hold property according to local custom, but by the same stroke had to follow Hindu laws in matters of family law and inheritance when, by reason of education and experience, they would often have preferred British laws.⁴⁰ Their conversion, then, placed them "outside the fold," so to speak, neither fully "Hindu" anymore in the eyes of their communities, nor ever fully equal to the British.

This quick survey of race and the law in the colonial Indies shows that through time, there were fewer and fewer legal advantages that accrued to Indonesians as a result of their being Christian. There may have been other advantages, of course – material, social, and spiritual. As religion made increasingly less difference in a legal sense, race grew commensurately in significance, although toward the end of the colonial period, there was also some retrenchment from blatantly racial criteria in hiring and in salary determination. By that point, however, there were more Hollanders living in the Indies than ever before. Merit-based qualifications for positions were often enough to reserve places for Europeans because the opportunities for Indonesians to get advanced education were so limited. As the numbers of Hollanders expanded in the Indies, and as they increasingly viewed themselves as temporary sojourners (*trekkers*) rather than people who intended to remain there for a lifetime (*blijvers*), racial barriers grew stronger in social life even as legal ones became less and less tenable.⁴¹ The point is that by the late nineteenth century, in the eyes of the law, and in their interaction with Europeans, Christian Natives remained resolutely *Natives*. To the extent that the movement for independence was a reaction to a perceived racial divide, Native Christians had no reason to doubt on which side of that divide they stood.

39 Van Randwijck, *Handelen en denken*, 271.

40 Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside the fold: Conversion, modernity, and belief*, Princeton University Press, 1998.

41 Gouda, *Dutch culture overseas*, 25.

Secular Nationalism: Missionary Effects

Missionaries were, for the most part, slow to accept, let alone encourage, Indonesian aspirations for *merdeka* (freedom).⁴² Yet Fred von der Mehden, author of *Religion and nationalism in Southeast Asia*, a book comparing Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, judged that, “There is no doubt that missionaries and the policy of the government toward them had their place in fomenting the nationalist movement.”⁴³ First, he argues, the mere presence of missionaries and their converts (although neither missionaries nor converts were ever very numerous) incited a negative reaction from Buddhist leaders in Burma and Muslim leaders in Indonesia who were attempting to mobilize nationalist sentiments through religious loyalties. That is, among non-Christians, the presence and activities of Christian missionaries provoked nationalistic reactions. Second, missionary education, especially the transmission of the colonialists’ language and Western political thought, helped sow the seeds of nationalism. For example, early nationalist organizations, such as the Young Men’s Buddhist Association in Burma, sometimes modeled themselves on missionary organizations. One of the rare instances in Indonesia where missionary education deliberately inspired nationalist sentiment and action was the school at Muntilan directed by the Jesuit Frans van Lith, although van Lith imagined a Javanese, not necessarily a pan-Indonesian, nationalism. Gerry van Klinken writes of Lith: “Instinctively he divided the world not into Catholic and non-Catholic, but rather into oppressor and oppressed - an embryonic liberation theology unusual at the time.”⁴⁴

Von der Mehden judged the Christian participation in the nationalist movement harshly: “Conservatism, indifference, and at times hostility toward nationalism characterized the majority of the Christians in Burma and the Indies. Only a minority was active in political life.”⁴⁵ Even so, his book includes some discussion of Christian nationalist groups and details some Christians’ involvement in the struggle for independence. Van Randwijck also notes that Christians in the mission fields served by the *Samenwerkende Zendingen Corporaties* (which in the final decades of the colonial era included most of the Protestant mission organizations) played, for the most part, no important role in nationalist political organizations.⁴⁶ Strictly speaking, however, only a minority

42 Ngelow, *Kekristenan dan nasionalisme*; Tan, *The attitude of Dutch Protestant missionaries*; J.A. Verdoorn, *De zending en het Indonesisch nationalisme*, (Vrij Nederland, 1945).

43 Von der Mehden, *Religion and nationalism*, 170.

44 Geert Arend van Klinken, *Migrant moralities: Christians and nationalist politics in emerging Indonesia: A biographical approach*, (Ph.D. diss. Griffith University, 1996) 371. See also Jan Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, Amboboeken, 1983.

45 Von der Mehden, *Religion and nationalism*, 182.

46 Van Randwijck, *Handelen en denken*, 341-42; See also Verdoorn, *De zending en het Indonesische nationalisme*, 11.

of Indonesians *as a whole* ever participated actively in the nationalist movement leading up to the revolution. Nationalistic visions became more prevalent among Indonesian Christians through time, as they did among the population as a whole, growing during the Japanese occupation and peaking in the revolutionary years. Again, like Indonesians in general, Christians who espoused nationalistic views were not unanimous in their ideas about what kind of nation and what kind of strategies for achieving it were best.

Contemporary scholars often approach nationalism from a more relativistic perspective than in the past, contextualizing the moralistic rhetoric that makes the nation almost sacrosanct, a valued end beyond question.⁴⁷ Teleology especially characterizes the state's officially sanctioned histories. David Henley (1996), writing in particular about Minahasan history, criticizes the teleological thinking which has determined that only pan-Indonesian nationalism was the genuine article, dismissing as insignificant the many regionally-based nationalisms. In addition to regional nationalism, diffuse movements for "uplift" and progress also characterized Indonesia during its formative "age in motion."⁴⁸ Indonesian church historians almost always understand the push for independent churches as arising from the same impulses as nationalism, although these efforts seldom count for much in other historians' assessment of Christians' place in the nationalist awakening.⁴⁹

Construing nationalism here as a broad and diverse set of movements that were not all pointed at exactly the same ends gives greater scope for thinking about Christians' place during the decades of Indonesia's birth. This "place," of course, was not the same for all Christians. Notably, some participated in the formation of political parties with Christian bases. The European-dominated *Christelijke Ethische Partij* (CEP, later CSP), devised to provide political leadership for Indonesian Christians, eventually suffered a schism along racial lines as Indonesians declined the CEP's paternalistic offer.⁵⁰ The *Indische Katholieke Partij*, formed in 1917, was another predominantly European party which also suffered schisms along racial lines.⁵¹ The *Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia*, the first Native Indonesian Christian party, emerged in 1930. What is more interesting than these efforts to mobilize parties along religious lines, is the extent to which Christians' nationalist sympathies were *not* channeled

47 Michael Billig, *Banal nationalism*, Sage, 1995; Partha Chatterjee, *The nation and its fragments*, Princeton University Press, 1993; Nicholas Dirks, "History as a sign of the modern", *Public Culture* 2, 2: 25-32.

48 David Henley, *Nationalism and regionalism in a colonial context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies*. *Verh. KITLV* 168, Leiden: KITLV, 1996; Takashi Shiraiishi, *Age in motion: Popular radicalism in Java, 1912-1926*. Cornell University Press, 1990.

49 Ngelow, *Kekristenen dan nasionalisme*; Verdoorn, *De zending en het Indonesisch Nationalisme*.

50 Van Randwijck, *Handelen en denken*, 341.

51 Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, 50.

through religious parties and organizations. Simatupang, in an article about Christian political participation in the Revolution, begins with a list of some of the most prominent Christian nationalists who were affiliated with various regional or issue-focused organizations. He explains that in the years before the Japanese occupation, many intellectuals allied themselves with like-minded others on political and social issues rather than joining groups defined by religious identity. Some, like Sam Ratulangi, felt that Christians, given their small number, would be ineffective as a political grouping, and that their energies would be better spent working with other Indonesians toward political goals they all shared.⁵²

The basic ingredients that spawned nationalist resistance elsewhere in the colonial world – literacy and education in a new “higher” culture – were concentrated in mission communities.⁵³ These communities should be reexamined as small crucibles of nationalism, and of secular nationalism especially. Perhaps as significant as the literacy and education they offered, missions also reproduced the same *social* dynamic by which nationalist sympathies emerged elsewhere in colonial society, regardless of how particular missionaries might have felt about the nationalist cause. To be specific, power and status within these colonial church communities remained firmly in European hands. Missionary organizations, in which leadership remained closed to non-Europeans, generated frustrations that precisely paralleled those generated by the colonial apparatus as a whole. Just as educated Creoles in the Americas rebelled against the limitations the metropolises placed on their autonomy, Western-educated Southeast Asians such as Ho Chi Minh and Sukarno reacted against the race barrier that contradicted the liberal, democratic ideals they had imbibed.⁵⁴ Likewise, indigenous Christian leaders in Indonesia faced not only limits to their ambitions within the church, but sometimes demeaning interpersonal experiences with missionaries and other Europeans that contradicted the ideals of Christian brotherhood. Nationalist ideals of self-determination thus rang true to them against this bitter experience. In short, the racial power structure of colonial missions set up a dynamic of resistance that paralleled what developed in other colonial spheres.

Acknowledging the resentment toward and opposition to European missionaries within indigenous Christian communities allows us also to understand how these religious communities spawned, in addition to nationalist sympathies, the secularization that appears everywhere as Christendom’s ironic twin. By secularization I do not mean the disenchantment of the world or the

52 Tahi Bonar Simatupang, “Partisipasi Kristen dalam revolusi dibidang politik” in *Partisipasi Kristen dalam nation building di Indonesia*, W. B. Sidjabat (ed.), Jakarta: BPK, 1968.

53 See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and nationalism*, (Cornell University Press, 1983) 33-34.

54 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, *Imagined communities*. Verso, 1991; George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, 1952.

disappearance of religion from life. Apparently, few Christians were shaken from their faith by confronting the challenge of nationalism. I mean simply a compartmentalization of selves and society such that religion comes to rest in its own separate sphere. How did Indonesian Christians come to conceive state and church as necessarily separate fields of activity and personal loyalty?

Others have observed a link between Christianity and secularization. Arend van Leeuwen proposed that the Judeo-Christian tradition contains within itself the inspiration for secularization. The uncompromising monotheism of the ancient Hebrews led them to reject their neighbors' religions of "cosmic totality" in which kings were regarded as divine. Van Leeuwen sees Christianity and secularization going hand in hand, an irresistible and irreversible dialectic. He lists nationalism – along with democracy, liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and science – among the natural spin-offs of a Christian world-view.⁵⁵ Likewise Elmer Miller, in an essay called, "The Christian missionary, agent of secularization," argues that the schools, clinics, and stores that make up mission installations all purvey a naturalistic world-view, despite what congregants learn at church about supernatural intervention (which seems to operate primarily in the past).⁵⁶ The material and bureaucratic necessities of operating mission fields communicated an implicit secular message, while the spoken word in the pulpits communicated a spiritual one. Together these conveyed to new Christians the sacred/secular divide characteristic of the West.⁵⁷ While these historical and organizational factors probably played their part in Indonesia as well, my focus here will be on how colonial converts' experiences with racism also contributed to their developing a divided or partible self.

The unequal power relations of colonial missions, negating the spiritual ideal of an equality of sibblingship under God, provoked mission followers to disentangle this ideal, and their identity as Christians, from the colonial practices that fell so far short of it.⁵⁸ Willing to give up neither their faith as Christians, nor their dignity and pride, some came to isolate their commitments as Christians from their political commitments. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" became, then, not just a verse or value taught verbally, nor even an awareness drawn from moving between the mission's own material and spiritual partitions, but also a self-defining, moral dilemma.

55 Arend Theodoor van Leeuwen, *Christianity in world history: The meeting of faiths East and West*. H. H. Hoskins (trans.), Scribners, 1964.

56 Elmer Miller, "The Christian missionary, agent of secularization", *Anthropological Quarterly* 43:14-22.

57 For a similar argument, see Mary Taylor Huber, "Constituting the church: Catholic Missionaries on the Sepik Frontier" *American Ethnologist* 14:107-25; and *The Bishops' Progress*, Smithsonian, 1988.

58 Jean and John Comaroff have traced a similar dynamic in South African Christianity in *Of revelation and revolution*, vol. 1, University of Chicago Press, 1991.

The problem of racism in the colonial church is not exactly news. Erasto Muga made the accusation that European missionaries teach a religion of love, a message that all men are brothers, but then “expect subservience and humiliation”, and explained how, in East Africa and elsewhere, separatist churches were the result.⁵⁹ As Hendrik Kraemer put it in 1928, “Anyone who is at home in the East and who has eyes to see and ears to hear will agree that the race problem is one of the most acute, painful, and dangerous questions with which the contemporary world has to struggle.”⁶⁰ In 1941, the conference of the *Nederlands-Indische Zendingsbond* (NIZB) which met at Karangpandan (near Solo) included for the first time three indigenous participants. One of these, Johannes Leimena, gave an address, “The meeting of the races in the church”, that was later published. In this work he recognized the way Christians are pulled in different directions by their relationship to a Universal Church on the one hand, and on the other, the awareness that God places each of us in a specific time in history and in a specific place on this earth. While admitting that animosity and stereotyping also marred relationships among Indonesian Christians of different ethnic groups, Leimena discerned that the conflict between the Dutch and the Indonesians was a product of their *colonial* relationship, that is “the fact that the Dutch here in the Indies, politically and economically speaking, have the power in their hands”. It was this colonial relationship through which the Dutch presumed to be, “consciously or unconsciously, on an other (higher) level than the indigenous people”.⁶¹ Some recent scholarship about colonialism and racism argues that the relationship between these two has to be investigated carefully in each context, because the quality and intensity of racism were not uniform in different colonial eras and relationships.⁶² In particular, some scholars suggest that missionaries were far less guilty of racist thinking and practice than other colonials. First, they often felt keenly their differences from other white colonials whose way of life was morally repugnant to them. Missionaries knew that “sin is not tied to skin”.⁶³ Second, the missionary enterprise – to convert or make Christians of others – is predicated on a basic sameness of all persons at the level of their spiritual life and needs. Missionaries were, in Peter Pels’ term, assimilationist,

59 Erasto Muga, *African responses to Western Christian religion: A sociological analysis of African separatist religions and political movements in East Africa*, (East African Literature Bureau, 1975) 128.

60 Hendrik Kraemer, “Het rassenprobleem en de Zending”, *De Opwekker* 73 (1928) 271-276, espec. 273.

61 Johannes Leimena, “De ontmoeting der rassen in de Kerk”, *De Opwekker* 87 (1941) 626-637, espec. 630, 631.

62 Ann Laura Stoler, “Rethinking colonial categories: European communities and the boundaries of rule” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31, no. 1:134-61.

63 Brett Christophers, *Positioning the missionary: John Booth Good and the colonial confluence of cultures*, (University of British Columbia Press, 1998) 42.

“less prone to essentialize, because for them, otherness is preferably already in the past.”⁶⁴ Missionaries aim to persuade others to imitate their commitment to Christ. But if imitation implies an eventual sameness between missionary and other, it also implies a current hierarchy. As Elizabeth Castelli reasons, imitation is a process of identifying with an other, but the model is always superior, more perfect, than the one who is trying to imitate it. The relationship is intrinsically asymmetrical, a relationship of power.⁶⁵ Commonly the missionary-convert relationship, in Indonesia and elsewhere, was metaphorized as a father/child relationship, a move that both naturalizes the power difference while mitigating it with intimacy.⁶⁶

The hierarchical differences that separated Europeans and Natives within the church had two facets: (1) interpersonal relationships and exchanges that resulted in mutual irritation, offence, and misunderstanding; and (2) barriers to the ambitions of men and women in the church. The first of these is the least amenable to being documented, existing in the ephemeral flow of behavior, most of which is never recorded. Still, numerous traces remain in the historical record. The second factor, Europeans’ retention of control over missions, is easier to see, and it had a longer lasting, institutional effect, delaying the development of indigenous leadership once the churches became independent. A brief sketch of how these factors affected two missions in Sumatra illustrates the basic trends. The origins of both the mission to the Toba Batak and to the Karo Batak are firmly linked with explicit divide and conquer motivations. That is, the expressed goal of Europeans in the region was to strengthen ethnic differentiation of Batak from the Muslim Malay majority and the Acehnese, making Christians of these pagan Batak in order to create political allies for the Dutch who would constitute “wedges” or “buffers” against any Islamic based resistance.⁶⁷ This does not mean that the missionaries who worked in Sumatra always sided with the government. For example, when four Batak leaders wrote the Governor General in 1917 protesting plantation leases to Europeans, and when workers clearing the land for the plantation expansion had to be put under armed guard to prevent attacks from local people, the government suspected the missionaries of helping to incite the protest.⁶⁸

64 Peter Pels, “The anthropology of colonialism: Culture, history, and the emergence of Western governmentality”, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26:163-83.

65 Elizabeth A. Castelli, *Imitating Paul: A discourse of power*, (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991).

66 Nicolas Thomas, *Colonialism’s culture: Anthropology, travel and government*, (Princeton University Press, 1994) 142.

67 Lance Castles, *The political life of a Sumatran residency: Tapanuli 1915-1940*, (Ph.D. Diss. Yale University, 1972); Rita Smith Kipp, *The early years of a Dutch colonial mission: The Karo field*, University of Michigan, 1990.

68 Castles, *The political life*, 120.

After some decades, the work of the German mission to the Toba stood out as a missionary success story, and Toba graduates of mission schools began filling the clerical and teaching jobs that were opening with an expanding colonial presence in the region. Yet this education, rather than creating Christian allies for the regime, created a “new, almost inevitably anti-colonial elite”.⁶⁹ The missionary presence and success also prompted a number of millenarian movements that exhibited anti-European elements. At least one of these movements, Parhudamdandam, spread into the Karo region in 1918.⁷⁰ Among the Toba, all of Parhudamdandam’s leaders were men who had had missionary educations or experience with the Church.⁷¹ “None of these sects represented the main stream of political and religious development in North Tapanuli. The typical Toba Batak response to the new world was to join it, not fight it.”⁷² Their joining the “new world”, however, also entailed forging new kinds of organizations and publications through which to achieve secular political ends. The Batak Christian Association (Hatopan Kristen Batak, HKB), founded in Balige in 1917, was one of these. Because the missionaries and others assumed that “a Christian movement would be quiet and loyal”, they were slow to object to it.⁷³ The HKB, a group “with a genuinely Christian character”, emphasized economic development and opposition to foreign influences, yet it campaigned for intangibles such as honor and pride as much as for material goals.⁷⁴ For example, it wanted to extend the term *tuan*, a term used for Europeans, to Bataks. More schools, irrigation, reduced taxes, and to be judged according to Western law were among HKB objectives, but then also no forced public labor *or else make it also compulsory for Europeans*.⁷⁵ This movement clearly wanted equality with the region’s white rulers. In 1919 the HKB clashed openly with the missionaries who denied them the use of the churches as meeting places, and by 1927 the HKB was beginning to call itself a “Self-Standing Church”.⁷⁶

The German mission was notable for its use of native helpers, a policy that had as much to do with exigency as principle.⁷⁷ By 1938 there were 38 Toba pas

69 *Ibidem*, 70.

70 J.H. Neumann, “De Perhoedamdandam in Deli” *Mededelingen NZG* 62:185-189.

71 Masashi Hirose, “The Batak millenarian response to the colonial order” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 25,2: 331-343.

72 Castles, *The political life*, 90.

73 *Ibidem*, 170.

74 Paul B. Pedersen, *Batak blood and Protestant soul: The development of national Batak churches in North Sumatra*, (Eerdmans, 1970) 150.

75 Castles, *The political life*, 152-53.

76 Pedersen, *Batak blood*, 151; J.R. Hutauruk, *Kemandirian gereja: Penelitian historis-sistematis tentang gerakan kemandirian gereja di Sumatera Utara dalam kancah pergolakan kolonialisme dan Gerakan Kebangsaan di Indonesia, 1899-1942*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1993.

77 Hendrik Kraemer, *Van godsdiensten en mensen: Reisindrukken van een Tambaram-ganger*,

tors.⁷⁸ Even so, some Toba Batak Christians chafed under missionary leadership:

But if they felt part of the church (in a sense in which they could not feel part of the Netherlands Indian state), they also felt subordinated within it to the authority of the white missionaries [- - -]. The missionaries did not value highly the moral attainments of their converts, and if they maintained autocratic control over, for instance, funds and buildings, and the imposition of church discipline, this was because they did not trust the Bataks to handle such matters properly.⁷⁹

In 1926, Gunung Mulia, representing the Batak region in the *Volksraad*, argued that a new secondary school planned for Tapanuli should not be a mission school. He preferred a neutral, government school at which both Christians and Muslims would feel at home. A regional newspaper in Sumatra excerpted his speech, and Mr. J. H. Meerwaldt, a teacher at a mission school in Narumonda in Central Batakland (and son of a missionary by the same name), responded to it in *De Banier*. Meerwaldt expressed astonishment that Mulia would adopt a neutral stance, being formerly a pupil in Christian schools and now an active member of a Reformed congregation in Batavia.⁸⁰ Later, Mulia rebutted Meerwaldt in the same venue, addressing each of Meerwaldt's arguments about the school, but above all explaining that in the *Volksraad* he represented not just the Christian Batak, but all Batak, including Muslims. Meerwaldt had mocked Batak parents as being thoroughly tyrannized by their own children, and Mulia pointed to this little insult and Meerwaldt's *geprikkelde* (irritated) tone as, "but once again a typical sample of the lack of tact and elementary knowledge of folk psychology by some workers in missions".⁸¹ This attitude brings some Batak to withdraw from missionary influences, if not to become Muslim, he continued. Mulia conceded that some missionaries were sympathetic to the "Asian Awakening." He listed some of them, such as Hendrik Kraemer, as exemplars. But as far as he could see, none of the missionaries to the Batak could be counted among this enlightened bunch. Until the very end of the colonial period Batak Christians continued to complain about the missionaries distancing themselves and other "minor matters" that they found offensive.⁸² The mission to the Karo was under Dutch leadership (*Nederlands Zendelingsgenootschap*, NZG), but the interpersonal dynamics of missionary/convert relationships were similar to what transpired among the Germans and the Toba Batak. One missionary's published annual report for

(G.F. Callenbach, 1940) 127; Pedersen, *Batak blood*, 101.

78 This figure is from Castles, *The political life*, 123; the Mission Statistics of the Zendingsconsulaat, published in *De Opwekker* in 1938, put the number at 58.

79 Castles, *The political life*, 138-39.

80 J.H. Meerwaldt, "Muloschool in Tapanoeli", *De Banier*, 18, 6 (11 Feb.) 42-44.

81 Gunung Mulia, "Muloschool in Tapanoeli", *De Banier*, 18, 11 (18 Mar.) 84-85.

82 Hendrik Kraemer, *From mission field to independent church: Report on a decisive decade in the growth of independent churches in Indonesia*. SCM Press, 1958.

1899 refers to the Karo Batak as “our big children”, an expression that was not thought out of place at that time.⁸³ By 1922, when J.H. Neumann published an article arguing for the training of local men as evangelistic helpers, such language would have been judged inappropriate. Neumann wrote about the task of training and leading local helpers: “Here the missionary, as a man of high character (not because of his race) and as a loving Christian must try to understand the native son, support and tolerate him, and can excuse much about him.” Having worked among the Karo for over 20 years at that point, Neumann was aware of how long it had taken *him* to become effective in his job, so he urged patience in dealing with indigenous helpers, and stressed his common humanity with them:

The Batak, among whom I work, are complete men, even as we Europeans, with the same wishes, desires, and feelings; with the same intellectual capacity, the same imaginative faculty, and the same bodily and spiritual needs [– – –].⁸⁴

Despite the best intentions of Neumann and his colleagues, the relations between European missionaries and their indigenous helpers still suffered at times from a hierarchical structure erected along a racial boundary. I once interviewed a Karo (GBKP) clergyman who had been ordained in the 1950s, and had served as a teacher for the mission in the previous decade. In fact, he was a former student of Neumann who later worked as a teacher under his direction. When he praised the missionaries for their organizational abilities and for their insistence on discipline from mission employees, I asked if he had been friendly with (*meriah ras*) the Dutch missionaries.

JB Certainly. But there was always the feeling that they were colonialists. It could not be otherwise. That was always there. Although I was friends with them, they often thought I was below them. That’s why, in that regard, I did not enjoy it – their always thinking they were higher than us. Their organization was good, but the experience of working with them – no. Older people, such as Pdt. Perangin-angin, were more congenial with the Dutch. Younger people did not find it so [congenial].

RSK Did you have a different view of this than your father? [His father, too, had been employed as a teacher in mission schools.]

JB My father was like me. As for colonialism, we Indonesians feel the same – we don’t like it! They often made us aware of their differences. For example, the Europeans were not happy if their seat was not different. That is why, if they came, we had to separate out their places to sit. It had to be different from the others. Or, for example, if we were walking with them, we could not go side by side. We had to be behind. That indeed was the difference we saw. “You go behind silih (brother-in-law)”, they would say. That’s an example.⁸⁵

83 M. Joustra, “Verslag van de zending onder de Karo-Bataks over 1899” *Mededelingen NZG* 43:11.

84 J.H. Neumann, “Goeroe Djamaat” *Mededelingen NZG* 66:131, 136.

85 Author’s interview with Pdt. Julianos Berahmana, Kabanjahe, 26 July 1983.

Experiences such as this must have been fairly general, and through these uncomfortable experiences, Karo Christians were in some sense prepared for the proposition that Indonesians – Muslim and Christian, Batak and Malay – were as "one" in relation to the Dutch. The tight rein Europeans kept over mission administration was repeated in the Karo mission which was far slower to train men for the ministry than were the Germans among the Toba.⁸⁶ The first two Karo men were finally studying for this when World War II brought European leadership of the mission to an end.

The mission to the Karo struggled throughout the colonial period with very little success, if success be measured only by the size of the church rolls. Christianity was too tightly associated with the Dutch colonial regime, including the hated plantations of that region, to attract many adherents. An historian of the revolution in this region says of the Karo, "In the turbulent 1940s they would become the most wholehearted supporters of the revolution against the Dutch."⁸⁷ The Japanese occupation and the social revolution that swept through North Sumatra as part of the war for independence was a frightening period for Karo Christians. Unlike the situation among the Simelungun Batak immediately to the south, the social revolution in Karoland brought little bloodshed, although two church leaders were among those who lost their lives because of their close associations with the colonial order.⁸⁸ Simon Rae assesses the significance of this revolutionary era for the newly independent church:

The sudden separation of the Karo church from its Dutch mission, and the political ordeal brought about by the occupation, in spite of their hardships, brought a new opportunity for Christians to discover their own identity [– –]. Now [– –] it was possible for people to begin to see the real nature of the church, once it was forced by changing circumstances to move away from its European colonial image.⁸⁹

After independence the Karo church under its own leadership started to grow by leaps and bounds.⁹⁰

These brief Toba and Karo cases show that despite a deliberate effort to inspire loyalty through the propagation of Christianity and Western education, the Dutch and German missionaries were not able to escape their involvement in the colonial order. Their own, perhaps unwitting, patriarchal behaviors

86 Simon H. Rae, *Breath becomes the wind: Old and new in Karo religion*, (University of Otago Press, 1994) 104.

87 Anthony Reid, *The blood of the people: Revolution and the end of traditional rule in Northern Sumatra*, (Oxford University Press, 1979) 57.

88 Frank Cooley, *Benih yang tumbuh IV: Suatu survey mengenai Gereja Batak Karo Protestan*, Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, 1976.

89 Rae, *Breath becomes the wind*, 116-17.

90 Rita Smith Kipp, "Conversion by affiliation: the history of the Karo Batak Protestant Church" *American Ethnologist* 22,4: 1-15.

sometimes undermined their Christian ideals of a love that was universal. Interpersonal relations that offended a Batak sense of pride, and a slowness to nurture and educate local spiritual leaders and turn authority over to them stirred anti-colonial feelings among the Toba and the Karo, both inside and outside the Christian fold, and set the stage for nationalist sympathies to emerge later.

Conclusion

The racial element in the colonial relationship has too often slipped from analytical view, although passing comments about it do appear in the literature on Christianity and nationalism. It is the element that best seals the nationalist credentials of Indonesian Christians, showing that these Christians cannot easily be written out of the nationalist struggle. That struggle remains important because it was central to defining Indonesia as a nation, and also validates claims to citizenship in the present. Because social and legal life in the colonial Indies were structured along racial lines, and because they were increasingly situated on the Native side of a dualistic legal system, Christians faced limitations and experiences that were similar to those of non-Christian Natives. Certainly access to Christian education was an enormous advantage in a world where educational opportunities for Natives were very slim indeed. Nonetheless, one can argue that students in Christian schools, members of missionary-led congregations, Native teachers and helper-evangelists in mission organizations, regardless of other advantages that accrued to them, were even more likely than other Indonesians to have first-hand interactions with Europeans, often on a daily basis, and therefore were more likely to experience moments when patriarchal and prejudicial attitudes erupted in those interactive contexts.

Mission communities themselves reproduced the colonial racial hierarchy of the society at large. It is no wonder, then, that these Christians sometimes rationalized their nationalist sympathies also in racial terms. Zakaria Ngelow cites the Chair of *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (PARKINDO), B. Probowinoto, who in 1945 spoke of national unity, using the term *bangsa* in a way that slips between words that would translate in English as both “nation” and “race”:

The existence of social divisions (*aliran*) and even religions cannot shatter our connections with our *bangsa*. Because the existence of those social divisions and religions does not change blood, body, and descent from another *bangsa*.⁹¹

91 Probowinoto, cited in Ngelow, *Kekristenan dan nasionalisme*, 184.

When the rising nationalist tide began to sweep Christian Indonesians along with it, they often threw in their lot with secular groups and parties who shared their social and political goals rather than join Christian parties. This may have been partly due to a strategic calculation that the small Christian minority could have little weight in national politics, but it undoubtedly also had a psychological dimension as well. The splitting off of one's religious identity from one's political self protects both those elements from challenging each other, but this psychic compartmentalization did not always come easily. Ngelow cites C.L. van Doorn, who in 1932 observed Javanese Christians struggling with the pull between being a Christian or a nationalist sympathizer: "For many people, that conflict was so painful that they could hardly bear the stress of it."⁹² Sometimes it took Christians longer, but eventually most decided that throwing off Dutch rule was a moral issue that, as Christians, they must embrace.

In recent decades, Christians have again faced some trying times. As the New Order began to crumble and finally ended amid bloodshed and protest, and then the country entered an uncertain period of transition, ethnic violence with sectarian dimensions, or sometimes purely sectarian violence, broke out in Java, Kalimantan, and Ambon. The painful secession of (Catholic) East Timor during this same period also heightened Muslim/Christian tensions. The moral imperative that has thus been thrust on Christian Indonesians today is to defend their right to remain Christian and to participate openly and without apology in the life of the nation.

92 Ngelow, *Kekristenan dan nasionalisme*, 137.

The race between Islam and Christianity theory revisited.
Islamization and Christianization
in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago 1530-1670

Azyumardi Azra

It is as a matter of fact impossible to understand the spread of Islam in the archipelago unless one takes into account the antagonism between the Moslem traders and the Portuguese.¹

There is little doubt that the Schrieke theory of the race between Islam and Christianity is one of the most hotly debated theories concerning the spread of Islam [and Christianity] in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. Since the time Schrieke proposed his theory, some other scholars have questioned its validity. One of the ardent critics of Schrieke's theory is Naguib al-Attas. He refuses to accept the argument put forward by this Dutch scholar that competition among Muslims and Christians had accelerated the spread of Islam, particularly between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries. Al-Attas is of the opinion that there is no continuation of the crusade between Islam and Christianity in the archipelago, since Islam did not regard Christianity as a serious contender. Furthermore, according to al-Attas, it is well known that it was only in the nineteenth century onwards that Christianity made any impact at all in the archipelago.²

Al-Attas could be right since he is one of the scholars who propose that Islam had spread in the archipelago, albeit in limited number, since the first century of Islam (or the seventh century CE). The Portuguese had not come in the region during this period. But al-Attas seems to have misread Schrieke's theory, since the Dutch scholar proposes that the race between Islam and Christianity took place mostly in the sixteenth century, during which period the Portuguese attempted very seriously to gain an upper hand in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.

Taking into consideration recent studies on the spread of Islam and Christianity, one may be tempted to accept Schrieke's theory. One of such latest studies is Reid.³ Implicitly accepting the basic argument of Schrieke, Reid proposes that what was taking place during the same period put forward by Schrieke was the polarization and religious boundaries, particularly between Islam and Christianity. The increasingly sharper polarization between the two religions

1 B.J.O. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, (2 parts, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955, 1957) II, 233.

2 Syed Naguib al-Attas, *Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1969) 18, 21-22.

3 Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680: Volume Two, Expansion and Crisis*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993) 143ff.

basically resulted from the “race between them” to win new converts. As Reid argues, in the sixteenth century large numbers of people both rural and urban were clearly converting to Islam, and identifying themselves as part of an international Islamic community. This explicit identification according to Reid can be attributed primarily to two factors; the direct and intense shipping links between South– east Asia and the Red Sea area, and the sharper polarization between the *Dar al-Islam* [Abode of Islam] and its enemies (*Dar al-Harb*). Reflecting on the history of Islamization in the archipelago, I would argue that the Schrieke theory has a lot of truth, though as Meilink-Roelofs reminds us, the crusading motive on the part of the Portuguese must not be Overemphasized.⁴ The theory, combined with other theories, in fact, can give us a better grasp of not only the history of Islamization but also of the vicissitudes of Christianity in the archipelago. Not only that, the Schrieke theory remains relevant to subsequent and recent history of the two religions in Indonesia in particular. In fact, the contemporary period is witnessing the ever heated competition between Islamic *dakwah* (preaching) and Christian missions in order to win new converts.⁵

The Race Theory: An Overview

To begin with, according to Schrieke, the Portuguese expansion in the archipelago must be viewed as a sequel to the Crusades in Europe and the Middle East. In his opinion, it was actually the lust for adventure and the ambition for nobility combined with religious zeal which were the driving forces setting the expansion of the Portuguese in motion. Following the expulsion of the Moors (Muslims) from the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese, after having gained a foothold in Ceuta on the north coast of Muslim Africa, proceeded to make further conquests along the west coast and finally rounded the Cape of Good Hope on their way to India and the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.⁶ Schrieke emphasizes, more than any else factor, the crusading spirit in the following way:

Religious zeal, nourished in the tradition of the Crusades and the remembrance of the bitter struggle with the Moors in the Iberian Peninsula, certainly continued to be an essential motivation [---]. The religious element remained a factor of significance in Spanish politics

4 M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) 117.

5 Cf. Robert W. Hefner, “Of Faith and Commitment: Christian Conversion in Muslim Java”, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

6 Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, I, 37; II, 232-233.

in later times as well. For the inhabitants of the [Iberian] peninsula a Mohammedan was a "Moor", an object of abhorrence.⁷

Not only that, the Portuguese and the Spaniards, or the Europeans as a whole, harboured antipathy and hatred for the Muslims and their faith. Furthermore, according to Schrieke, in this way the Crusade ideal continued its influence. For a long time, the Portuguese had in mind closing an alliance with the legendary Christian ruler Prester John, whose empire was thought to lie in India; with his help they hoped to be able to bring the Crusade against the Moors to a successful end in the heart of their own territory.⁸

Proposing this strong argument, Schrieke lists the harsh and violent encounters between Islam and Christianity. The conflicts between the two were clearly motivated not only by religion, but also by political and economic interests. This can be clearly seen in the account given by Schrieke. When Constantinople had fallen (1204), the Abbasid Caliphate had succumbed before the Mongol hordes (1258), and Acre, the last stronghold of the Christians in Palestine, had been forced to submit to the Muslims (1291), then the centre of commercial activity shifted from the routes running from the Persian Gulf by way of Baghdad to the ports of Syria and Asia Minor. Another trade route, taken also by Muslims, was the sea route from the coast of Yemen through and along the Red Sea to Alexandria, Egypt, whence the precious products of the archipelago and the Far East reached Europe by way of the Italian commercial towns. It was to that busy transit trade that Egypt owed its prosperity under the rule of the Mamluks (1250-1517).

The predominant Muslim position in the international trade was also represented by Muslim outposts along the southern coast of the Indian sub-continent. They included Randir, Surat, and Cambay (Gujarat). In fact, they had been supposed to have played a significant role not only in Muslim international trade but also in the spread of Islam, supposedly including the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Gujarati merchants had already an upperhand in all the important trading centers in the Indian Ocean trade routes. The Gujarati merchants, mingled with the Arab and Persian traders, could be found in large numbers in Malacca and seemingly also in Pasai, northeast Sumatra.⁹

Thus, as Chaudhuri concludes, by all accounts the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were unusually prosperous in the history of the Indian Ocean trade. The vivid accounts given by the traveller Ibn Battuta of the Muslim trading centers, extending from North Africa to the Far East, were later confirmed by travelers of the fifteenth century such as the Persian ambassadors 'Abd al-

7 *Ibidem*, I, 38.

8 *Ibidem*, I, 39.

9 *Ibidem*, II, 233-234.

Razzaq, the Venetian Nicolo Conti, and the Genoan Santo Stefano. Based on their accounts, the Portuguese policy makers created a grand plan to enter the lucrative trade. But, Chaudhuri maintains, the eventual arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean abruptly ended the system of peaceful oceanic navigation that was such a marked feature of the region.¹⁰

Western Archipelago: The Contest and International Connections

The race for religion, trade, and power in the Indian Ocean region began in 1492 with Christopher Columbus' "discovery" of the so-called "New World" in the service of Spain, after being disappointed by Portuguese royal patronage. Six years later, on May 18, 1498, the Portuguese Vasco da Gama came to the Indian Ocean with his small fleet piloted across the open sea from East Africa by an Indian navigator; they dropped anchor before Calicut, the Malabar emporium.

With the arrival of the Portuguese in India in 1498, as Schrieke points out, the two opposing parties – Christians and Muslims – stood for a head on collision. On the one hand there were Muslims who had for hundred of years carried on an extensive and profitable trade as the unchallenged masters of the Indian Ocean. They believed that it was in their interest, commercial as well as religious, to exert their utmost to exclude any possible rivals, particularly the *kafir* Europeans. On the other hand, there were the Christian Portuguese who looked upon the Muslims as their natural enemies. The Portuguese *conquistadores* made no secret of it that their hostility and depredations against Muslims derived from the state of perpetual war between Christendom and Islamdom.¹¹

Having gained a stronghold in India, the Portuguese soon began to launch their sacred mission and materialize what Schrieke calls "a privilege allowed them through an extraordinary blessings of God" to rid the earth of as many Muslims as possible. Therefore, as early as 1500 the Portuguese attacked all Muslim merchant vessels on open seas, including the ships of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt. They also seized, plundered and killed all crew and passengers of the "Mecca ships", large Muslim merchant ships which carried also *haj* pilgrims.¹² The Portuguese atrocities had not escaped the attention of Muslim historiography. The Arab chronicles of Hadramawt, Yemen, for instance, referring to the Portuguese military campaigns in the early sixteenth century (1502-1503),

10 K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 63.

11 Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, II, 233-234; Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean*, 64.

12 Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, II, 234.

recorded vividly: "In this year [in the month of *Rajab*] the vessels of the Franks [Arabic term for the Portuguese] appeared at sea en route for India, Hormuz and those parts. They took about seven vessels, killing those on board and making some prisoners. This was their first action, May God curse them."¹³

The Portuguese violent attitude created not only what Chaudhuri calls "catastrophe" for the commercial activities in the Indian Ocean, but also religious rage on the part of the Mamluk Sultans and later, as we will see, the Ottoman Sultans as well. The Mamluk Sultans of Egypt, after receiving remonstrances from Muslim rulers of Gujarat and Southern Yemen, dispatched Fra Mauro, the prior of the monastery of Zion on Mount Sinai, to the Pope in Rome. Protesting the barbaric conduct of the Portuguese, the Sultan warned that he could take retaliatory measures against the Christian pilgrims in Palestine. The protest, which the Pope passed on to the Portuguese King Manuel, produced no change in Portuguese behavior. In contrast, they intensified their zeal to destroy Muslim trade as well as their passion for trade monopoly by venturing as far east as possible to the Straits of Malacca and to Maluku or the Moluccas.¹⁴

This is the typical way of the Portuguese in their attempts to expand their realm in the archipelago. As Reid has shown¹⁵, the Portuguese as a rule targeted the port city at which the whole trade of Southeast Asian export trade appeared to be concentrated. And Malacca was such a city. Having heard of the terror which the Portuguese had already spread everywhere in the Indian Ocean, it is no surprise that as soon as they made their first contact with Malacca in 1509, they met with strong opposition of its population consisting mainly of Javanese, South Indians, Gujaratis, Chams, Tagalogs and others.

Since the possession of Malacca was crucial for their monopoly, the Portuguese made no concessions. And the Portuguese were finally able to conquer the city in 1511, as Reid explains, for three reasons: firstly, because they concentrated on it an intensity of firepower unprecedented in the region "below the winds"; secondly because of the element of surprise; and thirdly because much of the city's population quickly deserted the Sultan of Malacca. And the Portuguese were also able to hold it, in spite of a dozen massive sieges conducted for instance by the Acehnese, during the ensuing century, because they constructed a fort that was very difficult to breach.¹⁶ But it is important to note that from the conquest of Malacca onwards the Portuguese were involved in bitter and bloody struggles against Muslim forces of the archipelago. This is particularly true

13 Cited in R.B. Serjeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) 43.

14 Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, II, 234-235; Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean*, 63.

15 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 271.

16 *Ibidem*, 271-272.

since the Portuguese conquests were accompanied by vigorous missionary activities; and these stirred the Muslims to action in their turn.¹⁷

The strongest and fiercest opponent of the Portuguese in the archipelago, no doubt, was the Acehese Sultanate. After the Portuguese conquest of Malacca, Aceh in the first quarter of the sixteenth century had replaced Malacca as the major Muslim trade force in the Indian Ocean, and had established strong international relations with some Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Ottoman Sultanate. Aceh eventually proved to be invincible to the Portuguese encroachment and attacks. The Acehese on the other hand attacked the Portuguese in Malacca in several occasions (1537, 1539, 1547, 1568, 1573, and 1575) without much success.

Open conflict and hostilities between the Portuguese and the Acehese first took place in 1526. An Acehese big ship destined for Jeddah was seized by the Portuguese in the Arabian Sea and its cargo was sold in Hormuz. Several years later, the Portuguese captured more Acehese ships and plundered their valuable cargoes off the coast of Arabia.¹⁸ The Portuguese were in position to be more aggressive, since – as Ricklefs points out – they were making certain technological advances which would allow them to launch one of the most daring overseas adventures of all time. They introduced artillery aboard ship.¹⁹ Despite the more advanced armaments of the Portuguese and their continued harassment and encroachment, Acehese ships were able to maintain their voyages across the Indian Ocean. Two Portuguese fleets sent in 1554 and 1555 to intercept Acehese ships were unsuccessful. Again, in 1559, the Portuguese failed to intercept and capture Acehese ships in the Red Sea. As a result, according to Venetian sources, in the years of 1565 and 1566, some fifty ships from the Kingdom of “Ashi” [Aceh] in Sumatra arrived annually in the Red Sea region.²⁰

The Portuguese terror in the Indian Ocean had come to the attention and become a concern of the Ottoman Sultans. There is little doubt that Malay-Indonesian rulers, especially the Acehese, were well aware of the Ottoman strong naval power and its increasingly predominant position in the trade of the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century. Not only that, given the fact that the Ottomans were co-religionists of the Muslim Acehese, it can reasonably be expected that they saw the Ottomans as their patrons. Therefore, it is very likely that there was some direct contact between the Acehese and Turkish traders in

17 Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, II, 235.

18 Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 145; Azyumardi Azra, “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ‘Ulama’”, (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1992) 107.

19 M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, (London: Macmillan, 1990) 20.

20 Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 144, 363; F.C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of Its Revival in the Sixteenth Century”, *The American Historical Review*, 45 (1939/40) 586.

Indian Ocean harbors. In any case, with their presence in the region, the Ottomans brought new hopes for Malay-Indonesian rulers and traders of getting some support in their struggle against the Portuguese.

The possible Ottoman support to the Acehnese and intervention in the Indian Ocean had been of great concern to the Portuguese. As early as 1519, the Portuguese in Malacca were worried by rumors of the dispatch by the “Grand Turk” of a Turkish fleet to help the Malacca Muslims. According to Pigafetta, who reports the rumors, the Portuguese soon sent a fleet to the Red Sea to intercept the Turks. When the Portuguese spotted some Turkish galleys stranded on a beach near Aden, they destroyed them without delay.²¹

For their part, the Ottoman authorities seemed to be fully informed of the Portuguese encroachment in the Indian Ocean. In 1525, the famous Turkish admiral in the Red Sea, Salman Reis (d. 1528), warned the Sublime Porte of the Portuguese menace to the Ottoman possessions in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf region. After giving a detailed description of the Portuguese offensive in various Indian Ocean ports, he goes on to report on the Portuguese in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and their danger to the Turkish spice trade. Salman Reis lastly suggests the dispatch of Ottoman power thither:

They [the Portuguese] also control the port [Pasai] of the great island called Shamatirah [Sumatra] [---] situated onwards beyond the island of Ceylon afore-said. It is said there they [*i.e.* the Portuguese] have two hundred infidels. With two hundred infidels they also captured the port of Malacca, opposite Sumatra [---]. Apparently all the spices come from these islands. Now these spices go to Portugal. Formerly, before the Portuguese captured those ports [---] there used to be a great deal of revenue [to the Ottoman] from spices in Egypt and a great deal of goods available. It is said that the accursed Portuguese hold the aforementioned ports with [only] two thousand men. Therefore, when our ships are ready, and God willing, move against them, their total destruction will be inevitable, for one fortress is unable to support another and they are not able to put up united opposition.²²

There is a religious tone in the term “accursed Portuguese”. Therefore, the religious factor was one of the most important in the establishment of closer links between the Acehnese Sultanate and the Ottomans. An informal alliance between them had in fact existed by the end of the 1530s. Their relation was certainly stronger with the increasing encroachment of the *kafir* Portuguese, who in 1521 had established a fort at neighboring Pasai. The Acehnese Sultan `Ali al-Mughayat Shah (r. 1511-1530), however, expelled them from Pasai in 1524. When Sultan `Ala al-Din Ri`ayat Shah al-Qahhar ascended the Acehnese throne in 1537, he felt the ever growing need for Ottoman support.

21 A. Pigafetta, *Magellan's Voyages*, (trans. & ed. R.A. Skelton, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 19.

22 Cited in: Salih Özbaran, *The Ottoman response to European expansion: studies on Ottoman-Portuguese relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman administration in the Arab lands during the sixteenth century*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994) 84.

The Portuguese on the other hand followed these Islamic connections against them very closely. Thus, Mendez Pinto, who was in the Straits of Malacca region in the late 1530s, reported that Sultan al-Qahhar had already forged an alliance with 160 Turks, some Abyssinians, unnumbered Gujaratis, and some 200 Malabari mercenaries, who had arrived in Aceh ready to fight for the Muslims' cause. Not only that. Later, Pinto was also informed that an additional Turkish force consisting of some 300 soldiers had again arrived in Aceh and that the Acehnese Sultan had signed a military and commercial pact with the Grand Turk (Sulayman the Magnificent) through the Pasha of Egypt in Cairo. In return for their military assistance, the Ottomans were granted by the Acehnese Sultan exclusive rights to a trading factory in Pasai.²³

Mutual animosity between the Portuguese and the Acehnese was long lasting. According to al-Raniri, one of the most celebrated *ulama* at the Acehnese court in the seventeenth century, Sultan al-Qahhar sent a mission to Istanbul to meet the Sultan "Rum", a Malay term referring to the Ottoman Sultans. And in June 1562 an Acehnese ambassador was already in Istanbul asking for military support to fight the Portuguese.²⁴ It appears that the Acehnese envoy was among those who had escaped a Portuguese attack a year earlier, as described by the *Annals of al-Shihri*, known also as *Tarikh al-Hadramawt*. These annals are apparently the earliest Arabic sources known reporting the presence and activities of the Acehnese ships in the Red Sea and their battles against the Portuguese.²⁵

In 1565 another Acehnese envoy named Husayn made an appearance in Istanbul. It is likely that he was the one who brought a petition from Sultan al-Qahhar to Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent. In that petition, the Acehnese Sultan addresses the Ottoman ruler as the Caliph of Islam and the Muslims. He then reports that the Portuguese had caused great difficulties to Muslim merchants and *haj* pilgrims on their way to Mecca and other Arabian ports. Therefore, military assistance of the Caliph was badly needed to save innocent Muslims who had continually been massacred by the infidel *Farangis* [Portuguese].²⁶

Sultan Sulayman could not himself help the Acehnese, for he died in 1566. The Acehnese mission, however, won the support of Sultan Selim II (r. 1566-74)

23 Mendes Pinto, *The Travels of Mendes Pinto*, trans. & ed. Rebecca D. Catz, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) 26-28, 36-37, 46-47.

24 Nur al-Din al-Raniri, *Bustan al-Salatin*, ed. T. Iskandar, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966) 31-32.

25 Affan Seljuq, "Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim Kingdoms in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago", *Der Islam* 57 (1980) 307; Serjeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles*, 10.

26 Naim R. Farooqi, "Moguls, Ottomans, and Pilgrims: Protecting the Routes to Mecca in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *The International History Review* (1988) 10, II, 215-216.

who issued an imperial decree for a major military expedition to Aceh. Around September 1567, the Turkish admiral at Suez, Kurtoglu Hizir Reis, was instructed to sail to Aceh with a fleet of fifteen galleys, and two barks with numerous master gunsmiths, soldiers, and artillery. The fleet, however, was diverted to Yemen to suppress a rebellion there which lasted until 1571. It appears that only a small part of the Turkish force ever reached Aceh. And it seems that they had not taken part in a major Acehnese attack on Portuguese Malacca in 1568.²⁷

The failure of the 1568 expedition and the death of Sultan al-Qahhar in 1571 did not lessen the Acehnese desire to expel the Portuguese from the region. According to one Indonesian historian, al-Qahhar's second successor, Sultan Mansur Shah (r. 1577-88), renewed Aceh's political and military relations with the Ottoman empire.²⁸ This is substantiated by Portuguese historical records. Jorge de Lemos, Vicegeneral Secretary to Goa in 1585, reported to Lisbon that the ruler of Aceh had again been negotiating with the Ottoman caliph for military assistance to mount a new offensive against the Portuguese.²⁹

It is not necessary to provide further accounts on subsequent relations between the Acehnese and the Ottomans. It is clear that the race between Muslims and Christians was evidently there, mostly of course involving trade and politics, but clearly also religion. And it is also clear that the Portuguese had almost no chance to spread Christianity except at Malacca, where they were able to put down some trace of Christianity. More than that, the Portuguese fairly soon ceased to be such a revolutionary force in the west of the archipelago; and it is also evident that they failed to control the Asian trade. This is because they simply had to spend all their available resources to defend themselves from the formidable attacks by the Acehnese. While on the other hand, for the Acehnese Muslims supported by Islamic international connections, continued encroachment of the Portuguese only led to the further consolidation of Islam.

Contest for the Eastern Archipelago

The contest for trade, politics, and religion between the Portuguese and the Muslims soon moved to the Eastern Archipelago or more precisely Maluku, a name ultimately derived from the Arab traders' term for the region, "*Jazirat al-Muluk*" or the land of many kings. The Portuguese came initially to Ambon,

27 Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia", in: Sartono Kartodirdjo (ed.), *Profiles of Malay Culture*, (Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1986) 116-118.

28 H.M. Zaimuddin, *Tarich Atjeh dan Nusantara*, (Medan: Pustaka Iskandar Muda, 1961) 272-277.

29 CR. Boxer, "A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh", *JSEAH* (1969) 10 III, 423.

then to Ternate, and later to Tidore island. It is necessary to recall that immediately after the capture of Malacca, the Portuguese had dispatched an exploratory expedition from Malacca to Maluku under Francisco Serrao. This was followed between 1511 and 1522 by regular trading voyages. As Reid pointed out, the Portuguese moved quickly to Maluku once they discovered that it was the true source of clove and nutmeg. After initially having harbored in Ambon, the Portuguese moved to Ternate, the main center of clove trade in the Eastern Archipelago. But it is important to note that the Portuguese could never control more than a fraction of Maluku cloves, let alone any other product, because of their involvement in the complex set of antagonisms and alliances.³⁰ It is important to point out, as Meilink-Roelofs makes it clear, that Islam had penetrated the eastern part of the archipelago region some fifty to eighty years before the coming of the Portuguese.³¹ According to De Graaf's assessment, Islam reached the Maluku region in the latter half of the fifteenth century. But he admits that there had been traces of Muslim influence a century before that. It seems that the first ruler in Maluku converting to Islam was the king of Ternate.³²

Before long, the Portuguese were entangled in bitter struggles not only among Muslim local rulers, but were also fighting against the Spaniards. The rulers of Muslim Ternate in particular warmly welcomed the Portuguese since they hoped that the Portuguese would not only buy their spices, but also help them in the fights against their rivals. Therefore the presence of the Portuguese, who were allowed by the Sultan of Ternate to build their central fort (1522), gave the inhabitants of the Ternate island a certain amount of prestige *vis-a-vis* their neighbors.³³

Faced with the close political and economic alliance between the Portuguese and the Ternatans, the Sultan of Tidore associated himself with the Spaniards who had come to the Maluku region after the death of Magellan. The Spaniards not only bought the spices at a price eight times higher than the Portuguese, but, more importantly, they also provided the much sought prestige to the ruler of Tidore.

This naturally led to competition and struggle between the Portuguese and Spaniards. The conflicts among the European themselves further eroded their prestige in the eyes of native Muslims. The Portuguese and Spaniards seemed to have realized that conflicts and hostilities among them would be of great benefit only for the Muslims. Therefore, after the Spanish capitulation on

30 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 272.

31 Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 155.

32 H.J. de Graaf, "South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century", in P.M. Holt *et al* (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2A, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 135-136.

33 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 272-273; Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 154-156.

Tidore, they signed the Treaty of Zaragoza (1529) which formally put an end to their conflicts with the Portuguese in Maluku. But in practice this did not work. There were in fact repeated skirmishes among them until 1546. Only at the end of the sixteenth century, when Portugal became a part of the Spanish empire (1580), did the presence of the Spanish in the Philippines serve to buttress Portuguese authority in the Maluku islands. But that came too late, because of political changes had already taken place among Muslim power and politics. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the relationship between the Portuguese and the Sultan of Ternate had grown steadily worse. In 1560s the Portuguese became increasingly irritated as Sultan Hairun of Ternate proved adept at manipulating them to advance his own authority and that of Islam. In 1570 the Portuguese treacherously murdered him. Hairun's son Baabullah used the outrage against this act to drive the Portuguese out of Ternate. Baabullah's victory over the Portuguese made him highly respected among the natives in the region, and in the years that followed most of the Maluku islands came within his sphere of influence.³⁴

There is no doubt that the religious factor was evident in the contest for the Eastern archipelago. Both Meilink-Roelofs and Reid conclude that the coming of the Portuguese and Spaniards had intensified the religious race between Muslims and Christians. As Reid maintains, in Eastern Indonesia as a whole the position of Islam and Christianity were almost equally tenuous in the mid-sixteenth century. The unstable *modus vivendi* between the Portuguese and the Sultanate of Ternate in clove trade allowed Christian as well as Muslim missionaries to make some headway among the still largely animist people of Maluku.³⁵

The success of Sultan Baabullah of Ternate in expelling the Portuguese undoubtedly provided momentum for further Islamization in Maluku as a whole. The Sultan, for instance, compelled most of the Christian supporters of the Portuguese throughout Maluku to adopt Islam as a sign of loyalty. Baabullah had already been an effective propagandist for Islam during his father's time. Now, after his victory, he was able to spread the faith through much of the Ambon area, to Buton, Selayar, some of the coastal kingdoms of east and north Sulawesi (Celebes), and even to southern Mindanao. Reid points out that the Portuguese and Spaniards believed that this crusading Sultan introduced "a great number of Arabian and Persian false prophets into Maluku, and sent envoys and missionaries to Brunei, Mindanao, Java and Aceh to encourage the holy war".³⁶

As a result, during Baabullah's reign (1570-83), and until the Dutch arrival in 1600, in spite of complicated religious loyalties, there was even a stronger sense

34 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 147; Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 159.

35 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 147.

36 *Ibidem*, 148.

than before that the acceptance of Islam was an essential part of loyalty to the ruler of Ternate.

On the other hand, the hope of the Portuguese (as well as the Spaniards) for massive conversion to Christianity in Maluku did not materialize. As De Graaf points out, this proved an idle hope. Only very few were baptized. Even the great apostle of Asia, Francis Xavier, who was in Maluku in 1546-7, was unable to loosen the hold of Islam there.³⁷ The failure had a lot to do with the erosion of the Portuguese image that had already suffered from the way in which many Portuguese miscondacted themselves towards the native Muslims, and from corrupt administration of various Portuguese official representatives in Maluku.³⁸

Conclusion

Thus, as Reid concludes, the Portuguese period was the time during which polarization and religious boundaries were becoming clearly drawn. And by the mid-seventeenth century this sharp distinction between Islam and non-Islam was already fading. The major conflicts were no longer between crusading Catholics and Islam, but between the religiously neutral VOC and its allies on one side and those who sought a freer system of trade on the other. Among both Muslims and Christians the age of crusades incited by religious fervor was over.³⁹ Considering much contradicting evidence for later periods up until today, Reid's conclusion should be critically reassessed. But this is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss.

37 De Graaf, "South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century", 135-136.

38 Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, 155.

39 Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, 143-150.

Studying Religious Change. Christianity, Islam and the Traditional Religion in Karoland, North Sumatra

Simon Rae

Synopsis

The present paper represents an attempt to examine the phenomenon of religious change from an objective viewpoint, using a combination of the participant-observer methods of the anthropologist, modified interview methods appropriate for the particular cultural situation, and both oral and literary historical methods. The attempt is to see the religion of one particular Sumatran society as a living, developing, changing social reality, within an environment of social change that was often radical and sometimes deeply traumatic.

Because much existing knowledge of Indonesian regional religions is based on information provided directly to researchers by traditional religious experts, an attempt was made in this study to focus clearly on the religious beliefs and practices of the Karo people themselves, rather than on the esoteric knowledge and world-view of their religious experts – the *guru*.

Emphasis is placed on the reception of new religions by the Karo people, rather than on the experience, attitudes or methodologies of missionaries and other messengers who brought them to North Sumatra.

The Problem Stated

Sixty years of persistent and well-informed Protestant missionary effort among the Karo people of North Sumatra (1890-1950) produced a Protestant church of only 5,000 members – which then grew to 35,000 in the next fifteen years (1950-1965) – to be followed by 60,000 new baptisms in the four years, 1966-1970.¹

Similarly, response to Islam in Karoland is marked by strong resistance until the 1960s, followed by significant growth in Karo conversions since then.² There were a few villages in the Karo highlands with significant Muslim communities before World War II, and other villages with one or two Muslim families. An unknown number of Karonese became Muslim in the lowland areas of the Malay sultanates, but in doing so they left the Karo community to *masuk Melayu* – to enter the predominantly (Muslim) Malay society of the east coast.

1 Rita Smith Kipp, *The Early Years of a Dutch Colonial Mission: The Karo Field*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990, surveys the initial fifteen years, 1889-1904, from the perspective of the mission and its staff. This basically historical study is enriched by Professor Kipp's earlier anthropological fieldwork in Karoland. Simon Rae, *Breath Becomes the Wind: Old and New in Karo Religion*, Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1994, surveyed the process of religious change into the late 1970s from the perspective of Karonese reaction to the intruding religions.

2 Because Muslim communities do not keep statistics of either new members or the membership of local communities one must rely instead on local government statistics, often expressed in terms of percentages of the total population, and on information from individual villages.

Finally, in recent decades, there has been observed some development toward a *de facto* secularism on the one hand and a revival of the traditional religion and an attempt to assimilate its beliefs and practices to one of the government-recognized Indonesian religions – in this case to Hinduism – on the other.

Background

The Karonese³ are a proto-Malay people inhabiting Karoland, a highland plateau in North Sumatra, and also much of the adjacent East Coast lowlands, where they were well established before the first European contacts. The Karo people form one of the six very distinct divisions of Batak society. Karo society experienced extensive Indian influence in the unrecorded past. It is still today characterized by a division into five primary clans, and by a primary focus on kinship relationships, which have been extensively described in Masri Singarimbun's *Kinship, Descent and Alliance Among the Karo Batak*, and in the doctoral dissertation of Rita Smith Kipp⁴. In pre-colonial times about half the male population was said to have been literate, using a traditional script of south Indian derivation. Karonese is an Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) language which has experienced gradual but extensive enrichment from Sanskrit and from neighboring regional languages.

Pre-colonial Karo society was 'stateless', characterized by village-based participatory democracies, sometimes grouped in larger village confederations (*urung*). The Karo people were frugal, industrious and self-reliant. The highlands were self-sufficient in all but salt, iron and cotton, and the Karonese of the lowlands were involved in both cropping (pepper in particular) and in trade to Penang and the Malay Peninsula.

Karo Traditional Religion

The traditional religion was known as *Perbegu* in earlier times, a term that may have been descriptive in the traditional society but later came to have negative connotations such as 'pagan' or 'heathenish'. Adherents of the traditional Karo

3 The term 'Karo Batak', common in the academic literature, is a western creation: the people call themselves Karonese (*kalak Karo* or *bangsa Karo*), their language Karonese (*cakap Karo*) and their homeland Karoland (*Taneh Karo*).

4 Masri Singarimbun, *Kinship Descent and Alliance Among the Karo Batak*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Rita Smith Kipp, "The Ideology of Kinship in Karo Batak Ritual", PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1976. A more recent collection of studies by Rita Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, Religion and Class in an Indonesian Society*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, is a valuable account of ethnicity, social structure and religious practice in contemporary Karo society.

religion centered their attention not only on the *begu* or spirit of the dead, but also on the cult of the *tendi* or spirit of the living. (At death the *tendi* was said to become a *begu*). Attention was also given to the nature spirits of land and water, mountain, and river and of places of particular awe and mystery. The spirits of recently deceased close kin were believed to offer support and protection and received offerings, but were later forgotten with the passing of time.

A major divinity was recognized by the Karonese, and spoken of by either traditional Batak or Sanskrit names (the latter, *Dibata*, being now recognized as the Batak name for God). This divinity was said to have a three-fold being (a triad rather than a trinity) – God Above, God in the Middle World and God Below, probably a local adaptation of Indian religious teaching. There were few rites associated with the divine triad, which was represented in daily life by other, more immediate, manifestations of the divine world.

Other supernatural beings were recognized, such as goblins, fairies and *jinn*. One very significant kin group also had a particular religious significance. These are the *kalimbubu* (one's wife's father and brothers and their families and one's mother's father and brothers and their families). This group was spoken of as *dibata niidah* or 'visible gods'. In traditional society they were seen as a source of life and blessing, a living manifestation of the divine world.

The Social Situation

Karo society was also characterized by competition or rivalry with both the lowland Malay population of the East Coast, and the population of Aceh to the north. Both these neighboring societies were Muslim. The Malay sultans, originally river-port rulers who controlled Karo trade outlets, and who could expand their own territories only at the expense of the lowland Karonese, found powerful sponsors and allies in the European colonial enterprises established on the coast from about 1863.

The intentions of the warlike and ardently Muslim Acehese were never certain. Forced Islamization (as happened in the southern Batak territories) was always seen as a possibility by some Karonese. On the other hand there are traditions that speak of friendly contact with the southern Aceh communities of Gayo and Alas. There is evidence that Acehese penetration of Karoland had been attempted in pre-colonial times, and it was probably only the protracted Dutch-Acehese war that prevented this being attempted again in the 19th century.

The lowland Karonese felt early the impact of colonial capitalism, and made active attempts to disrupt it. The Dutch colonial government did not occupy the independent Karo highland territory until 1904, so there were still informants in

Karoland in the 1970s who had experienced the whole cycle from an independent stateless village and *urung* democracy, through the colonial era (1904-1942), the Japanese occupation (1942-5), the revolution (August 1945-December 1949) to independence as part of the Republic of Indonesia.

In the 19th century the East Coast of Sumatra became 'dollar-land' for western enterprises which set about a ruthless capitalist exploitation of the land and its resources. In this process the sultans became wealthy and powerful, in a way they had never been before, but the local people – Malay and Batak – were, in the words of the Sumatran historian Tengku Lukman Sinar, "made poor in the midst of the wealth of their own land."⁵

The lowland Karonese resented this powerful intrusion into their traditional lands and enterprises (the European monopolies banned or destroyed much of the tradition enterprise of the lowland Karo croppers and traders). At first Karo people burned sheds and otherwise disrupted European cultivation, but in 1872 armed conflict broke out over a new concession at Sunggal. Even when the armed revolt was put down the pattern of looting, burning and disruption continued.

The Protestant Mission to Karoland

The decision to initiate a Protestant mission to the Karonese is associated historically with J.T. Cremer, a former administrator in East Sumatra and a firm advocate of opening up the outer provinces of the Indies for economic exploitation. Cremer entered parliament after returning to the Netherlands and served for a time as Colonial Minister.⁶ His suggested solution to the problem of the free Bataks and their disruptions was to evangelise them! Plantation interests expressed their support, and an invitation was extended to the Netherlands Missionary Society (NZG) to begin work among the Karonese. Initially the Mission was reluctant, feeling itself already over-extended and being suspicious of the real motive behind the invitation. However, when no other agency took up the opportunity the NZG transferred an experienced Dutch missionary educationist, with a group of Indonesian teachers to assist him, from North Celebes in 1890. The NZG was a lay association, made up mainly of people from the Netherlands Reformed Church and had been strongly influenced by the revival and pietist movements in Europe. The Society was

5 H. Tenku Luckman Sinar, "The Impact of Dutch Colonialism on the Malay Coastal States on the East Coast of Sumatra During the Nineteenth Century", *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, Noordwijkerhout, Netherlands, 19-22 May 1976*, (Leiden/Jakarta, 1978) 188.

6 Smith Kipp sets out the circumstances, *The Early Years of a Dutch Colonial Mission*, chap. II.

more progressive than some of its contemporaries, and some of the missionaries in Karoland made important contributions to the recording of language, culture, the traditional religion and the oral history of the Karo clans.⁷

Initially, the Dutch missionaries worked in the upper lowlands – and based their work on the establishment of village schools, financed by the plantation enterprises. The first base was at Buluh Awar, a staging post on the walking track from the coast to the highland plateau. Karo people here were polite, helpful – and disinterested. People helped build the first church, and came in large numbers to Christmas and similar special programs, but they progressively rejected schooling. The Mission in the lowlands was not resisted so much as ignored. The Karonese were suspicious of missionaries wanting to live in lowland villages, regarding them as either outcastes from European society or as spies or agents working on behalf of the colonial enterprises.

Missionaries visited the free Karo communities in the highlands and were welcomed there, unless they showed an interest in staying on! In 1902 an attempt was made to establish a mission base in Kabanjahe, on the plateau, at the invitation of a local chief who in retrospect seems to have been in need of some ‘backing’ in the struggle for power on the plateau. An alliance of other Karo leaders resisted and deposed this chief, and drove the missionaries off the plateau. The colonial administration took this opportunity to invade the plateau in 1904, ostensibly in defense of the deposed chief and the missionaries he was sponsoring but in fact as part of an Indies-wide campaign, at the end of the Aceh War, to occupy all the free territories remaining in the colony.

The Karonese clearly saw the 1904 invasion of the highlands as a military Christianization of their homeland. In their view it was the Mission that ‘brought’ the Dutch colonial government to the highlands, and it was the Mission that benefited from the *pax Neerlandica* which enabled the Kabanjahe and other mission bases to be developed on the plateau.

A Colonial Mission

The colonial era brought many changes to Karoland. A road, begun in 1906, extended from the existing lowland terminus to Kabanjahe, and then in two directions, to Kotacane, in Aceh, and to Pematang Siantar, in Simalungun. This effectively broke down the long-standing isolation of the highland Karonese, and at the same time opened an opportunity for inland Karonese to participate in the expanding economy of the East Coast of Sumatra.

7 A preliminary assessment, Simon Rae, “Religion and Ethnology: An Indonesian Case Study”, in Maurice Andrew, Peter Matheson and Simon Rae, eds., *Religious Studies in Dialogue: Essays in Honour of Albert C. Moore*, (Dunedin: Faculty of Theology, University of Otago, 1991) 125-133.

These developments were to change Karoland forever. Systematic health care was introduced, inter-village conflict was reduced, and slavery was abolished by the new regime. At the same time taxes were introduced, the old participatory democracy was subordinated to the interests of the colonial regime and many Karo communities came under the influence of Malay or Toba Batak populations in the general re-organization of local government and administration in what became the Province, and later the Governorship, of The East Coast of Sumatra.

Caught up in all this, the Karo felt that the whole of their society was under threat; their religion, values, culture and their freedom to organize their own lives. Because of this, Christianity was seen to be intrusive, the religion of invading foreigners. The activities of the Mission in the lowlands had been tolerated, and largely ignored. After 1904 Christianity was largely dismissed as agama *Belanda* – the religion of the Netherlanders, and its Indonesian converts as *Belanda hitam* – dark-skinned Netherlanders.

Radical Social Change

The Dutch colonial era in Sumatra ended in March 1942 with the Japanese invasion. The Japanese military administration, for political reasons, favored what they called native religions, among which they included Islam. Protestantism was seen as pro-Dutch but was not actively suppressed. Catholicism, at this time hardly represented at all in Karoland, was more favored, reflecting the importance of the Catholic community in Japan. There was no persecution of Christianity but churches and individual Christians experienced considerable restriction, during the Japanese occupation. Christians shared the great suffering of the civil population as Sumatra was increasingly blockaded by the Allies. This was the beginning of a slow process by which the small Christian population struggled to identify itself as part of the Karo community, rather than a part of the European enterprise.

Just prior to the Japanese invasion in 1942 the Protestant mission had established a Karo Synod, and the first two Karonese ministers were ordained, fifty years after the mission was established. These two men with a small group of teacher-evangelists held the Protestant church together through the Japanese occupation and the revolutionary struggle that followed Japan's surrender in 1945. During this time membership of the Protestant Church was maintained at about 5,000, new members just replacing natural losses over this period.⁸

The Indonesian Revolution, launched when news broke of the Japanese surrender, was in fact a much more difficult time for the Karo church than the

8 For detail, see Rae, *Breath Becomes the Wind*, chap. VII.

occupation had been. The Revolution in North Sumatra took the form of an armed popular uprising against the allied attempt to re-establish the former colonial regime. Traditional rulers were swept away, private armed factions emerged alongside the nationalist army, and there were two attempts by the returning colonial administration to destroy the Republican forces in North Sumatra by military action.

Many nationalists were convinced that Christians supported the attempt to restore Dutch rule, and some Christians were martyred in Karoland, and others died in the revolutionary struggle. It was at this time, however, that the Protestant church was able to assert its post-missionary Indonesian identity. Karo church leaders openly supported the Revolution and congregations prayed for its success. But most significantly Karo Christians shared the armed struggle and the evacuation of large elements of the civil population from the Dutch occupied territories in Karoland. In evacuation settlements the small Christian communities were seen to be an authentic part of Indonesian life, sharing the suffering and the aspirations of a people seeking freedom to develop their own national identity.

After the Revolution Karo society enjoyed a period of confident optimism. Political movements were strong. Now people sought the education they had rejected when it seemed part of a colonial strategy for cultural domination. People travelled widely and Karo society became integrated into the life of the new Republic.

A Growing Response

It was during this period that conversions to Christianity began to grow, taking membership from 5,000 in 1950 to 35,000 when the church celebrated the 75th anniversary of the beginning of the Christian mission to Karoland in 1965, just prior to the attempted coup d'état. During this period there is no evidence of a similar Karo openness to Islam.

Catholic Christianity had to make what was almost a new beginning in Karoland after 1950. During the colonial era Catholic work had been restricted under regulations that attempted to prevent the overlapping of different missions, and Catholic activity was just beginning on the borders of Karoland when the Japanese occupation forced the withdrawal of almost all the priests, most of whom, at that time, were Dutch.⁹

9 On Catholic developments in Karoland see Linus Föh OFMCap., "Sejarah Gereja Katolik di Wilayah Keuskupanagung Medan", in M.P.M. Muskens, ed., *Sejarah Gereja Katolik Indonesia* (Ende – Flores: Arnoldus, 5 volumes, 1973-1974) Vol. 3, 15-30; Rae, *Breath Becomes the Wind*, 106-108, 113-114, 158-159, 180-183; Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, 211-212 has additional detail.

Pentecostal Christianity entered Karoland in 1935, represented by the *Gereja Pentekosta di Indonesia* (GPDI)¹⁰ which established its first Sumatran congregation in Kabanjahe in that year. The largest Pentecostal group in Karoland, GPDI had over 9,000 members in 1986¹¹ but has been joined by other Pentecostal Churches, each seeking converts among both traditional Karonese and members of other churches.

The Assembly of the Holy Spirit (*Gereja Sidang Rohul Kudus*) was established in Medan in July 1959 by separation from the Assemblies of God (*Sidang Jumaat Allah*) and saw its main mission among the Karonese. It grew from eight members in 1959 to 6,914 members in North Sumatra by 1969.¹² A break-away group, the Victory of Faith Church (*Gereja Kemenagan Iman Indonesia, GKII*) was operating among Batak villages in Langkat in the 1970s.¹³

A small indigenous Karonese Pentecostal church, the Christian Pentecostal Peace Church,¹⁴ was established in the late 1930s by Johannes Purba, who had been an NCO on the warship *De Zeven Provinzien* and studied at the Bible School in Malang, Java, 1935-1936, after being released from naval prison. Isolated from other Pentecostal congregations this church has not grown greatly itself, but former members have been influential in other Pentecostal fellowships. At the time of the 1968-72 church survey there were three village congregations in Karoland, with a total membership of 800.¹⁵

A Multiplicity of Christian Churches

Always a challenge to both the established churches and the *adat* systems of the Batak communities Pentecostalism emphasized a strict line of division between faith and worldly life and offered simple, practical responses to people's problems. Their success ensured that GBPK and the Catholic Church would not be the sole representatives of Christianity in Karoland. In this respect they were

10 Originally *De Pinksterkerk in Nederlands-Indië*, registered as a legal body (rechtspersoon) in 1937, it was established by the Bethel Temple in Seattle, U.S.A.; Walter Lempp, comp., *Benih Yang Tumbuh XII: Suatu Survey Mengenai Gereja-Gereja di Sumatera Utara (Laporan Regional Sumatera Utara)*, (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Studi Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, 1976) 290-293.

11 Smith Kipp, "Christianity, Ethnicity, and Class", chap. IX in Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*.

12 Writer's observations and interviews in Langkat 1976; Lempp, *Benih Yang Tumbuh XII: Suatu Survey Mengenai Gereja-Gereja di Sumatera Utara*, 295-299. There is an interesting discussion of religious and social features of this church in Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, 204-214.

13 Writer's observations, Tanah Seribu, a Langkat village, 1976.

14 *Gereja Masehi Pentakosta Damai*, established as *Pinkstervrede Kabanjahe*.

15 Lempp, *Benih Yang Tumbuh XII: Suatu Survey Mengenai Gereja-Gereja di Sumatera Utara*, 306.

joined by the Methodist Church which in the 1970s moved beyond what had been a mutually comfortable cooperation with GBKP in the Langkat region to begin direct evangelism in the Karo homeland.

In the 1960s and 1970s Protestant growth took on the nature of a mass movement. GBKP, substantially the largest of the Christian churches registered 60,000 baptisms in the four-year period to 1970. Vigorous growth continued into the 1980s. The developing Catholic mission also prospered in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Karo Catholic community grew quickly although numbers are difficult to determine as Catholic parishes became territorial rather than ethnic in constitution during this period. By 1986 the Catholic Church in Karoland had 32,577 registered members, and was the second largest Karo church, offering a wide range of service and educational ministries in the region.¹⁶

Islam in the Post-Independence Era

While some openness to Islam was noted in the 1950s the preference, of Karonese wishing (or being urged) to enter one of the Government recognized religions, was at this time clearly and overwhelmingly still for Christianity. In 1950 the Department of Religion reported that there were about 5,000 Muslims in the Karo administration district, but most of these were not ethnic Karonese¹⁷ There was a slow increase in conversions to Islam in the years before the attempted coup d'état in 1965, mainly as a result of *dakwah* activity from Medan, and then a significant increase in the wake of that tumultuous event and its bloody aftermath.¹⁸

The total number of Muslims in Karoland rose from 24,150 in 1966 to 31,775 in 1970, 41,873 in 1983 and to 52,234 by 1985.¹⁹ This was a period of significant growth as Karonese came to see Islam as a real, and attractive, religious option.

The Traditional Religion

By this time also some reactions had set in against the growing Christian presence. A movement called *Perodak-odak* attempted to revive the primal religion, in the face of quite wide-spread disillusionment at the seeming failure

16 Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, 211-212.

17 Recorded by Smith Kipp in, "Muslim Karo", in Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, 215-238, spec. 220.

18 For example, Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, 221-222, notes a mass conversion, of 1,500, in Kabanjahe in 1968.

19 *Ibidem*.

of the democratic process to realize the aspirations of the Revolution. While it gave the church a fright, the *Perodak-odak* movement has quietly faded away.²⁰ By the 1970s, in fact, the Karo churches appear to have taken over the role dissenting groups had played during the Dutch and Japanese periods, offering both a hope for the future and mechanisms for engaging with the urgent issues of the present. In this latter respect there was a marked difference between GBKP, the Catholic Church and the Methodists with their social and community programs and the Pentecostal churches with their focus on enabling individuals to overcome the obstacles that blocked their way to a full and free life.

A movement calling itself ‘Hindu’ was observed in the highlands in the late 1970s, and has grown quietly since then. It appears to be a deliberate attempt to assimilate the Karo traditional religion to Hinduism, to form a Karonese equivalent of the government-recognized Hindu-Bali religion. Rituals observed in this Karo ‘Hindu’ cult in the late 1970s were clearly those of the traditional Karo religion, and followers questioned responded in terms of traditional Karo belief and practice.²¹

An Emerging Secularism

Finally, in the 1980s, it was becoming clear that many Karonese were adopting a cheerfully secular style of life. This group, which is now a much greater challenge to the various religious communities than are the small pockets of traditional, or revived-traditional belief, is made up of two elements. One of these might be described as ‘secularized perbegu’ – those who have simply given up the traditional religion and its practices without seeking any religious alternative. The other element is made up of lapsed or secularized Christians and Muslims.

Reports in the 1980s from the historic highland village of Batukarang indicated that people visiting from the towns and cities, who in the past would have urged their relatives and friends to become Christian, were no longer even attending church, and in some cases chided local people for continuing to take the new religion so seriously. As a former minister of the parish said, at this time, “Now people visiting their home village go to [pay their respects at] the family graves but do not even come to church”.²²

20 Rae, *Breath Becomes the Wind*, 194-195, 202.

21 *Ibidem*, based on 1970s observations. Compare more recent observations by Smith Kipp, “The Traditional Religion: Hinduism?” in Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, chap. XI.

22 Batukarang informants 1990. Compare Smith Kipp, “The Secularization of Karo Identities”, in Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, chap. XII.

The present outcome

The outcome of a hundred years of religious change in Karoland, 1890-1990, has not been the total Christianization so confidently expected when the mission began.²³ Rather, a dynamic and tolerant religious pluralism has emerged, held together, ironically, by the traditional bonds of Karo custom and kinship which are, generally speaking, more significant to the modern Karonese than are questions of difference of religious faith.

It will be clear from what has been said that initial Karo responses to both Islam and Christianity were conditioned by political perceptions. Islam was seen as the religion of the coastal Malay states (already intruding upon Karo territory, Karo communities and Karo enterprises on the East Coast) and the religion of their powerful Acehese neighbor. Karo were also very well aware of the forced Islamization of parts of the southern Batak territories during the Padri wars. Islam therefore, until modern times, was seen as an uncertain even dangerous, influence to the north, east and south of the free Batak territories.

The circumstances in which the Christian mission was initiated in 1890, and the fact that it was supported financially by European plantation enterprises, meant that it was compromised from the outset in Karo eyes. The fact that it was missionary penetration of the free Karo territories that seemed to provide opportunity for the Dutch military occupation of the highlands in 1904 further confirmed Karo perceptions that Christianity, also, was the religion of an intrusive and threatening foreign community.

Of course conversions did take place. According to oral traditions some Karo people became Muslim on the coast, for a variety of personal reasons. No doubt religious conviction was an important factor, once ethnic prejudice had been overcome, for many features of Islam, from its mysticism to its egalitarianism, have strong appeal to the Karonese. Conversions to Christian faith, such as there were, were also influenced by many individual factors, and often arose from close contact with missionaries, or from a quest for the secret to the 'success' of the Europeans and their enterprises.

The beginning of large-scale conversion to Christianity came before the 1965 attempted coup d'état, which is often credited with frightening large numbers of Indonesians into one or other of the recognized religions, to avoid the possibility of being denounced as communist. Rather it appears that experiences during the Japanese occupation and during the revolutionary struggle which followed, when people saw Christians sharing their hardship and struggle without any foreign backing, together with the clear and uncompromising support of the Karo church for the nationalist cause, had begun to erode the image of Christianity as a 'European religion' by the early 1950s.

23 E.g. C. Lekkerkerker, *Land en Volk van Sumatra*, (Leiden, 1916) 173: "It is expected that the Christianization of the whole Karo people is only a matter of time".

The quality of the early Karo church leaders, who came to play an important role in community leadership during the occupation and the revolution, quickly established the fact that Christianity now had a Karo 'face', and that the church was an organization genuinely interested in the well-being of the whole Karo community. By the 1950s, Christians who had been trained in the church youth program began to take roles in local leadership and administration. The Karo Batak Protestant Church was in fact the first Karo-wide institution established in a society whose largest political unit had, up to this time, been the *urung*, or local confederation of villages.

Over stretched for personnel and resources, the small church gave a wide opportunity for lay leadership and participation, which attracted and encouraged enterprising people to its program. The title of 'elder', and later also of 'deacon', came to confer social status on those elected to these offices of lay leadership. Also, from the 1950s, Christianity came to be associated more and more with modern education and progressive ideas, and in time with western science and technology, giving rise to the promotional slogan, *majun agama asang kiniteken sipemena* – religion (meaning, in effect, a world religion) is more progressive than the traditional belief.

Perhaps most significant of all, the Karo church from the outset endorsed and supported Karo *adat*, or customary law, backing it up where appropriate with church regulations and sanctions (for example, with respect to marriage, divorce, and traditional elopement). In time also the church shook off missionary restrictions on the use of traditional music and dance, which in the traditional community had religious as well as recreational and cultural functions.

There can be no doubt that this clear endorsement of the 'Karo way', and its appropriateness, even as the community moved into a new and more progressive world, finally removed for many the last shadows of doubt as to the suitability of Christianity as a religious option for Karo people. It is significant that the Karo traditional orchestra, banned in missionary days, was used for the first time in a church program during the 75th anniversary celebrations, held just before the attempted coup in 1965. For many this was seen as the removal of a barrier long resented.²⁴ This renewed openness to the Karo way became another factor in the dramatic growth of Protestant community in the 1965-70 period.

All that being said, it must also be recognized that the attempted coup in 1965 and the subsequent danger of being denounced as a communist sympathizer encouraged many to embrace, at least outwardly, one of the government-

24 Looking back from 1976 the then Moderator, Rev. Anggapan Ginting Suka, commented: "GBKP was no longer labeled an enemy of culture", A. Ginting Suka, "Taggapan Ketua Moderamen Pada Akhir Penelitian", in Cooley, *Benih yang tumbuh IV: Suatu survey mengenai Gereja Batak Karo Protestan*, 147.

recognized religions. Communism had had a strong following in Karoland in the early 1960s, when it was a legally protected political movement,²⁵ and even some keen church members had been attracted by its humanitarian and reformist program.²⁶ In the turmoil following the coup and its suppression there was real danger of denunciation not only for those who had actually been involved in organizations related to the Communist Party but for any unfortunate enough to have a rival or enemy with a score to settle. It is not surprising then that many responded to the call to adopt a recognized religion. It was probably the *adat* question that determined the clear preference, at this time, for Christianity rather than Islam.

During the Revolution the Karonese had had their first chance to experience Islam in a positive context. Many of the evacuees from Karoland found temporary refuge and hospitality in the border territories of Aceh. Military service brought many others into close association with Muslim compatriots, and Islam came to be seen not simply as the religion of Malay and Acehnese neighbors, but as the religion of the leaders of the Revolution in Java, and indeed of the majority of Indonesia's population. Karo enthusiasm for the nationalist movement and for the revolutionary cause meant that these were positive associations. Karo people also came to distinguish between the role of the Malay ruling elite during the colonial era and the situation of the rural Malay people who were as much victims of the alliance between foreign capital and the local elites as the lowland Karonese themselves had been.

This, however, still did not lead to any large scale movement toward Islam among the Karonese. Separatist movements in staunchly Muslim Aceh meant that the threat of a 'holy war' against the 'pagan' Karonese was never entirely out of the question, and Karonese were aware of the repression of Christians in Aceh and elsewhere in Indonesia, where regional attempts were made to establish Islamic law. The most difficult point, however, was clearly a perceived Muslim disregard for Karo *adat*. Conversion to Islam meant that the believer came under Muslim law in three areas of life vital to the Karonese: marriage, divorce and inheritance. The 1958 Congress on Karo Cultural History still warned of this, seeing it as a threat to Karo society's freedom to organize its own life in the way it saw to be most appropriate.²⁷

25 In fact the British Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF) workers with GBKP, Martin and Elizabeth Goldsmith, had been forced to leave Indonesia hurriedly, in the face of threatened legal action, after Martin Goldsmith had offered a critique of Communism in a GBKP church program: Elizabeth Goldsmith, *God Can Be Trusted*, (London: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1974) 183-9, and Cooley, *Benih yang tumbuh IV: Suatu survey mengenai Gereja Batak Karo Protestan*, 131.

26 *Gereja Batak Karo Protestan* (GBKP) with Cooley, *Benih yang tumbuh IV: Suatu survey mengenai Gereja Batak Karo Protestan*, 15, 131, and Werner Grothaus, "Ein Volk im Aufbruch auf den guten Weg", in *Berichte RMG*, (March 1967) 48.

27 Documents from the *Kongres Sedjarah Kebudajaan Karo*, 24 May, 1958, were published as

After Independence, both Islam and Christianity came gradually to be seen as world religions, linking their Indonesian members to world-wide faith communities. Like Christianity, Islam began to prosper among the Karonese when it came to be presented by Karo people, either evangelists or family members.²⁸ Gradually also a better understanding of the cultural needs of the Karo Muslim communities developed among Muslim strategists. The international role, and growing prestige, of world Islam in the 1970s and 1980s, as a force able to resist both western capitalist exploitation and communist domination of the third world, gave the politically astute Karonese a better understanding of Islam as a major world religion. Competition between Islam and Christianity for the still uncommitted, or secularized, Karonese, moderated by the strong kinship system and the respect for others inculcated by Karo *adat*, is a distinct feature of the religious pluralism of modern Karoland.

Attempts to revive the traditional religion reflect, among other things, the frustration and disillusionment that followed the collapse of the political parties on which the Karonese had put so much hope after Independence, and a general dissatisfaction with the outcome of a generation of struggle. The new way no longer held the attraction or promise it had once embodied. Where the rituals of a new religion had not taken root a spiritual vacuum developed. While some opted for a *de facto secularism* others felt that the old way might still offer a new or better hope.

Perodak-odak failed to make a lasting impact because Christianity had developed to a stage where it, and not a protest movement, offered in the mind of a clear majority the best hope for taking hold of the new situation and creating a better future. Of very considerable significance is the fact that, under Karo leadership, the church moved far from the pietist theology of an earlier time, and emphasized a faith that encouraged enterprise, self-help and responsibility. It encouraged people to become agents, and not victims, of social, economic and political change.

What future the Karonese form of Hinduism might have is difficult to judge. It is unlikely that the government will recognize it as an official religion. On the other hand it is the only religion in Karoland that is completely uncompromised by association with either colonialism or the failed experiment in party politics – there were official Catholic, Protestant and Islamic parties until the political reorganization that followed the failed coup in 1965.

Secularism is now a strong option in modern Karoland. Many have simply given up the old religion without embracing another, except for government registration purposes. Others have tried new religions and left them, for a wide

Sejarah Adat Istiadat dan Tata Susunan Rakyat Karo, Kabanjahe: Toko Bukit, various editions.

28 A very interesting assessment of the situation in the 1980s is presented by Smith Kipp, "Muslim Karo", in: Smith Kipp, *Dissociated Identities*, chap. X.

variety of reasons including disappointment, a sense of their irrelevance, frustration with either rituals or administrations that are difficult to comprehend or, increasingly, a sense that one can enjoy the benefits of modern life, such as progressive education, scientific farming, modern health care and the like, without following a religion.

The Karonese have always taken an acute interest in the outside world and many have come to see through the facade of western Christian civilization, and indeed to feel cheated by the reality of 'Christian' life as it is seen in the attitudes and behavior of the crowds of tourists who visit Karoland or in the appalling films and other manifestations of 'Christian culture' that come their way. This new secularism, cheerfully unconcerned about religions of any kind, presents a clear challenge to all the religious communities in modern Karoland. The present state of Karo religion is dynamic, fluid and mercifully tolerant. It is a good example of a fairly relaxed religious pluralism, where convictions are firmly held, and supported with vigor, but where everyone recognizes that the unity of families and communities is more important than the inappropriate or untimely advocacy of particular convictions and viewpoints. Ironically it is the *adat*, refined to meet the social situations of a changed world, that holds this religious pluralism together.

The nineteenth century as a category in Indonesian religious history

Th. van den End

I. Introductory remarks

In this essay, 'Indonesian religious history' is going to be interpreted as 'History of Indonesian Christianity'. I do not feel qualified to say anything about the place of religions other than Christianity in Indonesia's religious history, and I will refrain from doing so the more readily as Dr Azyumardi Azra will discuss our common subject from an Islamic viewpoint.

In the second place, it has to be recognized that this paper was written by a European. I realized in the course of the years that it is very difficult for me to write about Indonesian religious history, even Indonesian Christian history, from an Indonesian point of view, especially if the subject is not the history of Christianity in a certain area, such as Tana Toraja or the Central Moluccas, but in Indonesia as a whole. It is relatively easy to show the role of local circumstances when writing about, for example, Tana Toraja or Rote; it is much more difficult to do so when writing about Indonesia as a whole. As this paper is discussing 'Indonesian religious history', I could not help writing it at least in part from a Western point of view.

My third remark is that I can approach the matter under discussion only in a very general way. All kinds of distinctions and differentiations which can be given attention in a monograph or even in a textbook have to be ignored. This paper is like a large-scale road map, which shows only the main roads and tells nothing about the many possibilities to vary your route when travelling from one town to another by bike or on foot.

Finally, it has to be kept in mind that in this paper Protestant missions will get most attention, because Catholic missions in Indonesia did not get well under way until the end of the nineteenth century.

II. Characteristic features of the nineteenth century from the point of view of religion

The title of this essay states that the nineteenth century is a category in Indonesian religious history. That implies that, compared with the eighteenth or the twentieth century, the nineteenth century has some characteristic features which are not to be found in the period preceding or following it. I will accept this thesis as a working hypothesis and try to point out a number of those features. Afterwards we will see if they are really characteristic of the nineteenth century as such, or can be found in the preceding or the following eras as well. If the latter would be true, that would compel us to change the

words 'the nineteenth century' in the title or at least not to take them at face value.

1. The first characteristic feature of the nineteenth century would be *the establishment of the modern state*. In 1789 the Ancien Regime in France was toppled by the French Revolution, and during the following that revolution spread throughout the whole of continental Western Europe, including the Netherlands and Western Germany. Holland got a new constitution in 1798, and through Holland modern statehood came to the Indonesian Archipelago. The contrast between the Ancien Regime and the type of state replacing it was very great indeed. The pre-revolutionary body politic did not know individual subjects, but was composed of corporate bodies, estates, often having a jurisdiction of their own. Those subjects were loyal, not to the state as an abstract entity, but to the person of the king (in republics, like Venice or the Dutch Republic, to their township, or their village). The modern state was organized in quite a different way. It only did know individual subjects. These subjects were equal; the same body of law applied to all; nobody was to be given preferential treatment for any reason whatsoever, including race or religion. In the context of Indonesian history we may add two remarks. First, the structure of the old indigenous kingdoms in many respects resembled that of Western states during the Ancien Regime. Furthermore, the colonial state was less modern than its parent state in Europe, for the simple reason that it was not the political form of a nation, but the way an occupying regime organized itself. Nevertheless, the Indonesians increasingly took part in the political processes going on within the framework of the colonial state. It may be argued that the colonial state became more and more modern, and that this process of modernization of the state entered a further stage with the founding of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945.

2. Nowhere is the contrast between the nineteenth-century state and its predecessor more striking than in the way both related to religion. In the pre-modern era, religion preceded the state. Actually, at least in theory, state and society were functions of religion. The loyalty of the subjects to their sovereign was defined in religious terms. Therefore, religious pluriformity was not desired, and at most tolerated; the state (again: at least in theory) maintained its professed religion against competitors with all means at its disposal, including physical violence. At the end of the eighteenth century all this changed. The state became the highest value, people being loyal to the state for its own sake. As a consequence, the state did not put itself anymore to the service of any religion. On the contrary, *the state proclaimed itself neutral in religious matters*. This entailed tolerance: each subject was allowed to seek out for himself the best way to obtain salvation. In the Indonesian context this means that in the nineteenth century it was no longer possible for the church to request

from the state that it demolish mosques or Chinese temples. Actually VOC officials would not even consider demolishing a mosque or even a Chinese temple, but at that time the church felt justified in requesting them to do so and in a few cases the officials had to give in to its pressure.¹ In the nineteenth century similar requests from the side of the church were unthinkable. However, religious tolerance did not mean that for the state religion was unimportant. It is true that the state was no longer a function of religion, but now religion became a function of the state. It was put into the service of the state, to strengthen it, and to teach its citizens the right behaviour. The most striking example of this civil religion are the regulations of the so-called Protestant Church in the Netherlands Indies (*Indische Kerk*), especially art. 4, which states that the preservation of public order and harmony, and the cultivating of patriotism are among the duties of each church official. But keeping this rule in mind is also important for understanding the relationship between the Netherlands Indies government and the missionary societies during the colonial era. Especially after 1900, when the government had started to carry out its 'ethical' program, the missions loyally supported the colonial status quo. The government even tried in several ways to harness Islam to its own interests.

During the nineteenth century, the subjugation of the missions to the interests of the state was hardly felt by Indonesian Christians. At the time, many of them did not live in Dutch-occupied areas (Northern Sumatra, Eastern Indonesia), and those who did mostly belonged to the lower social strata (Java). Sometimes a government official would even protect Indonesian Christian leaders from oppressive missionaries, as was the case with Sadrach. The special relationship of church and missions with the state became meaningful to Indonesian Christians after 1900, when a number of them began participating in the political process. As church and missionary societies were loyal to the status quo, they took a negative attitude to nationalist activities on the part of church workers or educated members of the congregation. As a result, many well-educated Christians did not feel at home within the structures of church and mission, and opted out of those structures, though retaining their faith.²

1 H.E. Niemeijer, *Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuur: Batavia 1619-1725*, (Diss. VU, Amsterdam, 1996) 137-143 (mosques) and 152-163 (Chinese sanctuaries); C.W.Th. van Boetzelaer, *De Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indië* ('s-Gravenhage 1947) 75, 188.

2 This is a key to the understanding of the religious position of Christian nationalists like M.H. Manullang, A.J. Patty, G.S.S.J. Ratulangi, and others. On Manullang see J.R. Hutauruk, *Die Batakkirche vor ihrer Unabhängigkeit (1899-1942): Probleme der kirchlichen Unabhängigkeit angesichts der Problematik von Mission, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus* (Unpublished dissertation, Hamburg, 1980) 144f., 164-171 (Indonesian edition: *Kemandirian Gereja* (BPK: Jakarta, 1992) 68, 86, 103-108. On Patty: Richard Z. Leirissa, *Maluku dalam perjuangan nasional Indonesia* (Lembaga Sejarah Fakultas Sasstra UI, 1975) 58f., 63-75, 85f.; on Ratulangi: Z.J. Ngelow, *Kekristenan dan Nasionalisme: Perjumpaan Umat Kristen Protestan dengan Pergerakan Nasional Indonesia, 1900-1950*, (BPK Gunung Mulia, 1994) 325 s.v.;

3. This fundamental change in the relation of the state and religion brought with it an equally *fundamental change in the relationship between state and church*. During the Ancien Regime the religion embraced and favoured by the state was embodied by a certain church, which was the established church. In England this was the Anglican Church, in France the Catholic Church, in the Dutch Republic and the Dutch overseas possessions the Reformed Church. With the exception of a few Protestant countries, minority churches were not tolerated. Consequently in 1743 the Moravian Brothers (*Hernhutters*) were refused admission to the VOC territories, and the large numbers of Lutherans serving the Company were granted permission to found a congregation of their own in Batavia alongside the Reformed Church only in 1743, and even then only grudgingly. The Catholics never had a church building in any VOC settlement, and visiting priests, if caught, were put aboard a ship and deported. After the turn of the century this situation changed fundamentally. In Europe, country after country proclaimed liberty of religion. In Indonesia, Catholic priests entered in 1808, without encountering any difficulties. The Reformed Church was no longer the established church. However, as the state considered the church a useful instrument, it continued to grant it certain privileges, such as paying the salaries of the ministers of the Protestant Church. But it is typical of the new relationship between state and church that the same privilege was granted to the Catholic and the Lutheran Church, and in some cases even to Islamic institutions.³ In the same way, after 1900 the state subsidized the activities of the missionary societies in the field of education and medical care, and, in an indirect way, even the mission work in the narrow sense of the word. Moreover, as the colonial state considered Islam a potential threat, in some mission fields it helped the mission in keeping Islam out.

The missionaries, many of whom came from a pietist environment, had no difficulty in accepting the neutrality of the state. However, for the Indonesian Christians it was difficult to conceive that a government they considered to be Christian did nothing to promote the Christian faith and in some cases even frustrated missionary efforts. On several occasions they expressed their astonishment at the 'neutral' attitude taken by government officials.⁴

4. Being tied to a state which had declared itself neutral in religious matters, *in a sense the church was expected to be neutral*, too. The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies were reorganized by the state in

W.S.T. Pondaag, *Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Nasional Mahaputera Dr. G.S.S.J. Ratu Langie*, Surabaya, t.t. A detailed case study of the conflict between European missionaries and a well-educated Indonesian Christian in Tana Toraja, Sulawesi, in: B. Plaisier, *Over bruggen en grenzen: De communicatie van het evangelie in het Torasjagebied (1913-1942)* (Zoetermeer, 1993) 220-224.

3 See M. Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1980) 136-145.

4 An example can be found in Th. van den End, *De Gereformeerde Zendingbond 1901-1961: Een bronnenpublicatie* (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1985) 191.

such a way, that they had no specific confession of faith. That the confession inherited from the spiritual ancestors was not maintained against its detractors is the basic fact in the history of the nineteenth-century Reformed Church of the Netherlands, from which flowed all important developments in the history of Dutch Reformed Protestantism until far into the twentieth century. As for the Protestant Church in the Netherlands Indies, its first set of regulations (1844) did not even contain a creedal formula. The church was just a government agency for the fulfilment of the religious needs of its Protestant subjects. The government attempted to treat the Catholic Church in the same way, but this Church, being essentially supra-national, could not as easily be harnessed to the interests of the state. In 1847 the colonial state had to recognize its independence.

5. It is clear that a Church which had allowed itself to be degraded to a government agency would not exert itself to propagate the Christian faith. Even if the government had allowed it to do so, there would not have been an inner urge towards mission, like there had been in the Reformed Church of the Netherlands and its representatives in the Indies during the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth century. Instead, in the nineteenth century *the Protestant missionary enterprise was taken over by individual Christians, organized in missionary societies*. In the Netherlands, the first of those societies was the *Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap* (NZG), founded in 1797. During the nineteenth century a number of new societies was founded. These societies divided the Netherlands Indies among themselves or were allotted territories by the government, and set about Christianizing the population of those territories. During the first part of the century the government took them in its service, like it did with the Protestant Church (especially in the Moluccas, 1815-1864), but this cooperation did not last, as the societies were not willing to conform to the requirements of the neutral state. In this sense the missionary societies were the Protestant counterpart of the Catholic Church: both refused to be reduced to instruments of the state. During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century Protestant mission work in the Netherlands Indies was in great part carried out by these societies.

Within the Catholic Church, a similar development occurred, albeit for different reasons. During the first half of the century the Catholics in Indonesia were served by secular clergy; in the second half religious congregations took over, first of all the Society of Jesus (SJ). However, in this case the reason was not the neutralization of the official church by the state, as was the case with the Protestants, but the fact that the church hierarchy itself was not equipped to do mission work.

In the matter of religious neutrality, too, it is worth while to look at the attitude of Indonesian Christians. Christian Ambonese, for example, did not suffer the inhibitions of their European ministers in spreading the Gospel. From 1870

onwards, many of them took service with the missionary societies, first in Irian and Halmahera, afterwards on Sulawesi and even on Java and Sumatra. Here they were among the most ardent evangelists. When, about 1910, the Protestant Church started mission work in the Southern Moluccas and other regions, there was no lack of evangelists, many Christians from the Central Moluccas being ready to be sent even to the most isolated posts.

6. The activity of the missionary societies brought about an *expansion of missionary activities* to most of the Archipelago. At the beginning of the century, outside the main cities of Java sizeable Christian communities could be found only in the Central Moluccas and on the island of Rote. In addition, isolated groups existed in Northern Sulawesi, including the Sangir Islands. At the end of the century Christianity was being propagated in the whole of Indonesia, with the exception of a number of strongly islamized territories in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The most important achievement of the century was the planting of Christian Churches, albeit small, on the island of Java – the first time in history new churches were founded in the midst of Muslim communities. However, this territorial expansion was not yet accompanied by a comparable statistical growth. Around 1800 the number of Protestant Christians in the Archipelago was about 55.000, most of whom lived in the Central Moluccas; the number of Roman Catholics, who were concentrated on Flores, was much smaller. In the 1860s the number of Protestants had increased to 120.000, in 1900 to about 350.000, nearly all of them in the Central Moluccas, North Sulawesi, and North Sumatra, while the number of Roman Catholics had scarcely grown yet. However, on most other mission fields (Irian, Halmahera, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Central Kalimantan, West Java, and elsewhere) growth started only in the twentieth century. In 1941, there were about 1.750.000 Protestant and about 600.000 Roman Catholic Christians in the Archipelago (including about 100.000 Europeans).

During the nineteenth century, Islam, which had long since occupied Java, most of Sumatra, the coastal areas of Kalimantan, parts of Sulawesi, and several smaller islands in Eastern Indonesia, expanded into the interior. Southern Tapanuli and several districts in Southern and Northern Sulawesi were islamized. It was found that missionary work in areas where Islam already had gained a foothold could not hope to win over but a small minority of the population. Conversely, where a mission had been established first, Islam could not hope to turn the tide.

7. The *theological background* of the Protestant Church ministers and missionaries who came to Indonesia during the nineteenth century was quite different from that of their predecessors. Classic Reformed theology had been theocentric. Everything, including all human activities within and outside the church, was directed to the glory of God. Instead, during the nineteenth century an *anthropocentric, evolutionary theology* prevailed. Christianity was seen as

a stage (the highest stage, to be sure) in the development of mankind towards a higher form of spirituality. The Christian faith was described as a force which raised the human personality, and humanity as a whole, to a higher level. This type of theological thinking was represented by the dominant theological currents of the time in the Netherlands, first the 'evangelical' or 'Groninger' theology ('evangelical' having quite a different meaning here than in current parlance) and then the 'ethical' theology. The high level of social and moral development supposedly reached in Western societies as a fruit of Christianity was called 'civilisation' (*beschaving, Kultur, peradaban*).

Throughout the nineteenth century the Indonesian Christians did not participate in this development. This was due to several factors. In the first place, few, if any, of them received a Dutch-language education, let alone a theological training comparable to that of their European ministers or even the missionaries. Secondly, the indigenous Christians were not exposed to the new doctrines put forward by the church ministers because these almost exclusively served the European members. Mission work and the existing Indonesian congregations were left to the missionaries and to their counterparts within the Protestant Church, the *hulppredikers*, who with a few exceptions⁵ were more orthodox than the *predikanten*. Indonesian theology was not non-existent, but it was not academic, it did develop independent from Western academic theology, and in most cases it was not reduced to writing.⁶ Besides, it did not spring, like most Western theology during the nineteenth century, from the encounter with the Enlightenment, but expressed the Christian faith in the framework of Javanese mysticism, mythology and literary forms.⁷ This non-Western theology, with a few exceptions, was rejected by the Western missionaries – the ministers of the Protestant Church did not even know about its existence.⁸

5 Examples in A.Th. Boone, "‘In het belang van zedelijkheid en recht’: J.N. Wiersma (1833-1907) als modernistisch zendeling en hulpprediker te Ratahan (Minahassa)", in: Th. van den End et al., *Twee eeuwen Nederlandse zending, 1797-1997: Twaalf opstellen* (Zoetermeer, 1997) 91-113; Chr.G.F. de Jong, 'Een verloren generatie zendelingen in de Molukken in de negentiende eeuw: de "vijftigers"', *DZOK 7-1* (2000) 42f.

6 See A.G. Hoekema, *Denken in dynamisch evenwicht: De wordingsgeschiedenis van de nationale protestantse theologie in Indonesië (ca. 1860-1960)*, Zoetermeer, [1994]; Indonesian edition: *Berpikir dalam keseimbangan yang dinamis: sejarah lahirnya teologi Protestan nasional di Indonesia (sekitar 1860-1960)*, BPK 1997; cf. Edwin Wierenga, 'Het christendom als het ware inzicht. Hendrik Kraemers uitgave van Paulus Tosari's *Rasa sejati*', in: Willem van der Molen en Bernard Arps (eds.), *Woord en Schrift in de Oost*, Leiden, 2000 (Semaian 19).

7 John Mansford Prior, 'Indonesia', paper presented at the meeting of the History of Christianity in Indonesia Project, 19-23 June 2000 at Utrecht, p. 7.

8 Hoekema, *Denken in dynamisch evenwicht*, 28-82. An example of the severe judgment by the missionaries on Tunggul Wulung in Th. van den End, *De Nederlandse Zendingsvereniging in West Java: Een bronnenpublicatie* (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1991) 118f. (S. Coolsma); on Sadrach cf. C. Guillot, *L'affaire Sadrach: Un essai de Christianisation à Java au XIX^e Siècle*,

8. The switch of Western Church and missions to a different theology brought with it the *transition to a different missiological paradigm*. In classic Reformed missiology the goal of missionary work was the glory of God and the planting of new local churches. Nineteenth-century missions pursued other goals: the saving of souls and the raising of non-Christian persons and peoples to a higher level of consciousness and spirituality. It is amazing to see that even in the mind of very orthodox missionaries Gospel and civilisation (*i.e.* Western civilisation) were inseparable, so that they had no difficulty in seeing themselves as agents of civilisation. When they criticized the activities of the neutral government or of non-religious Europeans, it was not for bringing Western civilisation to the inhabitants of the colony, but for bringing it without the Gospel.⁹

9. The anthropocentric orientation of Christian theology and missiology during the nineteenth century caused it to have a *strong pedagogical flavour*. Education was a keyword. First thing to do for all missionaries upon arrival was to found a school. Its goal was not in the first place to enable people to read the Bible and the Catechism, as it was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but to ‘enlighten’ them, to make them participate in the fruits of civilisation. Education even had a wider meaning: it encompassed the whole personality, which was to be raised by the Christian message to a higher level supposedly reached already by Western Christians and by the missionaries themselves.¹⁰

As for the Indonesian Christians, this Western education actually had an impact on them. It accustomed them to Western values, like discipline, keeping to a fixed time-table and the importance of the written word. However, throughout the nineteenth century the measure of education received was not enough really to introduce them to the modern world. Learning to read was fine, but as yet there were hardly any books in any Indonesian language which would convey to them knowledge from outside. As a large majority of the Indonesian Christians lived in the countryside, most of them would continue to eke out a living as subsistence farmers. Those who received a secondary education and subsequently were employed by the mission (or by the government) had not learnt to think for themselves. The missionaries themselves had been provided with an occupational training and this they passed on to their pupils. These accepted the outer signs of Western civilisation, like wearing Western-style

Paris, 1981 (Indonesian edition: *Kiai Sadrach, Riwayat Kristenisasi di Jawa*, Grafiti Pers: Jakarta, 1985).

9 See, for example, letters of West Java missionaries, orthodox men of the pietist variety, in Th. van den End, *De Nederlandse Zendingsvereniging in West-Java*, 55, 58, 108f., 111f., 133, 174f., 368f..

10 As late as 1925 the influential missionary, dr A.C. Kruyt, expressed this conviction, buttressed by an evolutionary *theologia religionum*, in his *Van Heiden tot Christen*, Oegstgeest, [1925], esp. Chapter VIII.

clothes, and shoes, but only in the twentieth century, when the level of education was raised and Dutch-language schools were introduced, they became citizens of a wider world.

10. Nineteenth-century missions could not help being *paternalistic*. Like a teacher seldom will admit that his pupil has grown to be his equal, let alone that he has surpassed him, so it is difficult for a missionary to admit that his converts have reached his own standard. As a consequence he will not easily relinquish his function as a spiritual guide. During the nineteenth century, and beyond, Christian congregations and their indigenous leaders were never allowed to function on their own, without supervision and guidance by the missionary. A keyword here is 'not yet ripe' (*nog niet rijp, belum matang*). In some cases we can even speak of racism, because it was stated that the peoples among whom the mission was working would never be able to reach the level of Western Christians. But mostly the missionary maintained that in some unspecified future the indigenous Christians would be able to do without his guidance and to govern themselves.

As has been said above, in the nineteenth century most Indonesian Christians lived in the countryside and had received only the most elementary education. So it was natural for them to look at the missionary as their guide and model. This was the more true as he was a member of the dominant group. The missionary could, and indeed did, serve his people as an intermediary with the government; he could pass on their wishes and needs to the government official and could explain to them what the government required from them.¹¹ Here again, only in the twentieth century the situation changed.

As a consequence, an *Indonesian leadership could not develop* other than on the local level. In this there was a striking similarity between the nineteenth century and the VOC era. In both cases, the reluctance of the government to have leading positions held by strangers was an important factor. For the nineteenth century, more than for the VOC era, we can blame the paternalism of the missionaries for the lacking of Indonesian leaders. But a more fundamental cause was the fact that the kind of Christianity the mission was bringing to Indonesia was bound up with modern, Western-type education. So long as higher education of this type was not available in Indonesia, Indonesians could not become church leaders.¹²

11 Guillot points to this aspect in his study on Sadrach (Guillot, *L'affaire Sadrach*, 149, 296-308, 326-327).

12 During the VOC era Seminaries were established in Nalur (1690), Colombo (1696) and Batavia (1745), where the curriculum included Greek and Hebrew, but they were short-lived. During the nineteenth century only the RMG mission in North Sumatra had a Seminar which turned out church ministers (who were authorized to administer the sacraments). See C.W.Th. van Boetzelaer, *De Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indië*, 241-246; J.S. Aritonang, *Mission Schools in Batakland (Indonesia) 1861-1940* (Leiden etc., 1994) 187ff.

11. Both in the VOC era and in the nineteenth century *the judgment on non-Christian religions was negative*, but for different reasons. For a seventeenth-century Christian theologian, paganism was devil worship, and Islam a false religion. So the reason for rejecting them was purely religious. A typical nineteenth-century missionary would rather stress the fact that pagans have forgotten the true way of serving their Creator (degeneration theory), and in the case of Islam he would maintain that this religion was unable to adapt to modern civilization.

The attitude of Indonesian Christians in this respect was very diverse. On the one hand they tended to agree with the radical rejection of non-Christian religiosity by the missionaries. On the other hand, as has been pointed out by F.C. Kamma, they consciously retained much elements of their old customs and beliefs, especially the bond with the ancestors.¹³ In a similar way the Javanese Christian leaders of the nineteenth century rejected essential elements from Javanese and Islamic religion and culture, while retaining many elements from their Javanese and even orthodox Islamic environment.¹⁴

12. Having pointed out the particular features of the nineteenth-century missionaries and their message, we may affirm that, compared with their predecessors, they brought a different type of Christianity to Indonesia. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries indigenous Christianity in Indonesia was practically restricted to Northern Sulawesi, the Central Moluccas, and the island of Rote. This Christianity was what I would call archaic, or pre-modern, in character. Thereby I mean that church and state were closely connected, that stress was laid on conformity to ritual and rules more than on inner conviction, and that Christianity was largely interpreted in the framework of magical and mythical thinking. The nineteenth-century mission brought to Indonesia *a different, more modern variety of Christianity*. On the mission fields opened during this century, there was hardly any bond between the Christian communities and the state. Inner conviction was stressed to the degree that sometimes people had to wait for years before the missionaries would be willing to administer baptism to them. In order to arouse and fortify that conviction the missionaries exerted themselves to make the Gospel as understandable as possible to the people. Therefore the Scriptures were

13 F.C. Kamma, *Dit Wonderlijke Werk: Het probleem van de communicatie tussen oost en west gebaseerd op de ervaringen in het zendingswerk op Nieuw-Guinea (Irian Jaya) 1855-1972. Een socio-missiologicalische benadering II* (Oegstgeest, 1977) 669 (Indonesian edition: *Ajaib di mata kita* (BPK: Jakarta, 1994) III, 320).

14 'Sadrach embraced wisdom from Jawanese culture, law from islam while doctrinal content came from the Gospel' (John Mansford Prior, 'Indonesia', 10, cf. Guillot, *L'affaire Sadrach*, 309-325). Essential elements of Javanese culture rejected by Sadrach were the *wayang*, the cleaning of the graves of the ancestors, and the rendering of offerings to the spirits. It might be argued that the banning of those customs was as much inspired by Sadrach's upbringing as a *santri* as by his Christian conviction.

translated into the local languages and hymns were created in those languages. The mythical-magical world-view did not disappear, but it was recognized and opposed as conflicting with the Christian faith.

It is interesting that the old Christian communities on, for example, Ambon or Rote did not passively accept this modern variety of the faith. The resistance put up by Rotenese Christians to the more modern pattern of Christianity brought to their island by nineteenth-century missionaries is described by James Fox, in his *Harvest of the Palm*,¹⁵ while Cooley's *Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Society* is centred on the struggle between *adat* and (the post-Enlightenment variety of) the Christian faith in the Central Moluccas.¹⁶ The struggle between the old and the new way of being a Christian is an important feature of the history of these communities during the nineteenth century.

III. Where does the 'nineteenth century' begin and end?

Starting from the characteristic features listed above, we can now determine more definitely the abstract notion 'nineteenth century'. When did it start? In Indonesia the Ancien Regime, represented by the VOC, came to an end on December 31, 1799, exactly and the modern state was established as of January 1, 1800. That change brought with it freedom of religion, and a different position of the church. Three years earlier, in 1797, a missionary society had been founded in the Netherlands; because of the wars which were going on in Europe, the first missionaries of that society arrived in Indonesia only in 1814. Also around 1800 the shift from a more or less orthodox Calvinist theology to ways of thinking influenced by the Enlightenment became manifest in the theological faculties, and some years later in the Reformed Church of the Netherlands as well. The new motives and goals of the mission were evident already in the first publications of the Netherlands Missionary Society. We can conclude that for our purposes the year 1800 makes an excellent choice as the *terminus a quo* of the nineteenth century.

Determining the *terminus ad quem* is less easy. Usually 1901 is taken as marking a new beginning in the relation of the Netherlands with its colony: ethical policy, Address of the Throne of the Kuyper Cabinet. The beginning of the twentieth century also saw the implementation of colonial government in territories which until then had been considered as belonging to the Dutch sphere of influence, but had not been under direct Dutch authority. Both

15 The resistance by Rotenese Christians to the more modern pattern of Christianity brought to their island by nineteenth-century missionaries is described by James Fox, in his *Harvest of the Palm: Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia* (Cambridge [Mass.] and London, 1977) 129-136, 146f.

16 Frank L. Cooley, *Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Society*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1961; Indonesian edition *Mimbar dan Takhta: Hubungan Lembaga-lembaga Keagamaan dan Pemerintahan di Maluku Tengah*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan: Jakarta, 1987.

changes directly affected the history of religion (not only the history of Christianity) in Indonesia. In the history of missions proper, the year 1898 marks the first attempt, by A. Hueting, to use a new approach, in which the Gospel is announced not so much to the individual, but rather to the community.¹⁷ At the same time the Catholic mission was given a stronger foundation by the arrival of new religious orders on the mission field. However, the continuity between the nineteenth century and the first decennia of the twentieth century should not be overlooked. After 1900 the cooperation between government and mission was much closer than before, although the basic attitude of the colonial government towards the spread of Christianity in its dominions remained the same. Protestant missions became better equipped to handle mass movements, and the Catholic mission was given a stronger foundation, but in the first quarter of the twentieth century there still was no change in their basic theological outlook. This made it difficult for them to recognize Indonesian Christians and their faith as of equal standing with their own, and let Indonesians bear responsibility and form independent church organizations. Real changes occurred in the 1920s. In Protestantism a more theocentric theology superseded the anthropological pattern of thought common in the nineteenth century, but this happened only after the First World War. As a result, in the second half of the 1920s and in the 1930s the Protestant mission freed itself of its obsession with pedagogy; paternalism abated, the term 'civilisation' disappeared from the missionary vocabulary (as did the word 'sin'), and institutions were founded where Indonesian church leaders were educated; a number of churches became autonomous. In 1935 the bond which tied the Protestant Church (*Indische Kerk*) to the state was severed (but only in 1950 the state ceased to pay the salaries of the Protestant ministers). In the Catholic Church in 1926 for the first time an Indonesian was ordained a priest. In Protestantism many of these changes were due to initiatives taken by Dr H. Kraemer (arrived 1922). But not until the coming of the Japanese and the internment of the missionaries all vestiges of nineteenth century structures were radically swept away. Within the Catholic mission a radical change occurred even later. Of course its theological pattern was different, Catholic theology never having been influenced by the Enlightenment as heavily as Protestant thinking. But the domination of missionary congregations and paternalism were even stronger, if possible, than in Protestant missions. In 1940 for the first time an Indonesian was elevated to episcopal rank; in 1963 hierarchy was established in the Catholic Church of Indonesia, but only in the 1980s the majority of the bishops were (born) Indonesians.

17 See A. Hueting, *Geschiedenis der Zending op het eiland Halmahera (Utrechtsche Zending-Vereeniging)* (Oegstgeest, [1930]) Chapter VIII. Several years later, A.C. Kruyt postponed baptism of the first converts on the Posso mission field until the entire community to which they belonged, including its chief, was ready to embrace Christianity.

Seen from the point of view of Indonesian Christianity, the nineteenth century is an era of dependence, which by no means comes to an end in 1900, but goes on until the 1930s or even 1942. However, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the establishing of a network of a Dutch-language school system, which eventually made possible the founding of the *Hogere Theologische School* in Jakarta (1934). With that, Indonesian theology got in touch with Western theological thinking. Even before the HThS was founded, the emergence of Indonesian nationalism and the participation of Indonesians in the oecumenical movement marked a widening of the horizon for Indonesian Christians. But until after World War II the HThS was run by Westerners, while the position of Western-educated Indonesians, even theologians, in the churches was marginal until 1942.

Drawing conclusions from all this, I tend to consider the ‘nineteenth century’ as a part of a longer era, which stretches from 1800 until the end of the colonial era (1942/5). If this is accepted, the two decennia in which the changes outlined in the last two paragraphs occurred could be considered the closing period of the nineteenth century taken in this sense. In that case 1942 would be an adequate conclusion. It has the disadvantage of being an event outside church history. But if we look for internal developments in the churches (for example: rather than to political events) for determining the end of the era of modern mission, we are handicapped by the divisions within Christianity, where each denomination and each regional church has its own history.

If we opt for a more literal interpretation of the concept ‘nineteenth century’, so that the era 1900-1942 is treated in a separate chapter, we still have to determine the boundary between the two. The rise of the national movement would be a nice choice, but it has the disadvantage of being an event outside the church, as is the proclamation of the ethical policy (1901) or the Japanese-Russian war (1905). It is less easy to bind the emergence of ‘ethical missiology’ as outlined above to a given year, but it has the advantage of being within the sphere of church and mission. So if we opt for a separation between the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, we may consider Huetting’s initiative of 1898 the beginning of a new century, in which Indonesians and their culture became more and more prominent in church and mission.

IV. Periodization

There is no neat subdivision to be made. From a political point of view, one could point at the English interregnum (Java 1811-1816), but this was early in the century and lasted too short to bring real changes. The transition from a conservative pattern of government to a more liberal system, which took place in the 1860s, brought more liberty to the mission, but was no landmark in the history of Indonesian Christianity. As for the *expansion* of Christianity: there

was a marked territorial expansion from 1855 onwards, but until the end of the century there was hardly any statistical progress in Eastern Indonesia (Irian, Halmahera, Timor, Southern Sulawesi), and only a very slow advance in Kalimantan and Java. On the contrary, in the Minahasa and Batakland the mission made headway within a generation. The question why the population of these two areas accepted Christianity so much more readily than other Indonesian peoples deserves to be studied. But anyhow, the marked differences between the various mission fields prevent us from drawing up a periodization from the point of view of expansion. As for *leadership*, it is to be noted that in 1844 the reorganization of the established Church included the founding of the *Kerkbestuur* (Board) which superseded the Batavia church council as the central authority in the church. But this did not regard the missionary societies, which remained outside the framework of the Protestant Church. In Java, about 1860, the missionary enterprise which had been started by Javanese was taken over by European missionaries; but here, too, the history of other mission fields is different. In the case of Protestant missions, the *relationship of missions and colonial state* offers a convenient way of dividing the century in three parts. One may distinguish a period of close cooperation with the state (1800-±1840), two decennia in which, at least outside the Moluccas, the two drew more and more apart (±1840-1864), and thirty years of separate existence of the two. But events in the Catholic Church take a different course. Here the year 1847 has some importance, because then the mission conquered a remarkable degree of freedom from the state (Nota der Punten). But, as said above, the real start of Catholic mission work among the indigenous population came only about 1900. In short, we will have to resign to the fact that a monograph on the history of Christianity in Indonesia during the nineteenth century cannot apply a clear-cut periodization, but will have to use a subdivision based on different viewpoints.

Boekbesprekingen

Cornelis van der Kooi & Jan de Bruijn, *Kuyper Reconsidered. Aspects of his Life and Work* [= *VU Studies on Protestant History* 3] Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999, 320 pp., ISBN 90-5383-640-3, f 45,-.

George Harinck & Hans Krabbendam, *Breaches and Bridges: Reformed Subcultures in the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States* [= *VU Studies on Protestant History* 4] Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 2000, 166 pp., ISBN 30-5383-695-0, f 59,90.

Hans Krabbendam & Larry J. Wagenaar, *The Dutch-American Experience: Essays in Honor of Robert P. Swierenga* [= *VU Studies on Protestant History* 5] Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 2000, 300 pp., ISBN 30-5383-802-7, f 64,90.

A revival seems to take place in the study of Dutch-American church history. A pivotal role in this development is played on the Dutch side of the Atlantic by the Roosevelt Study Centre at Middelburg, the Historical Documentation Centre of the Vrije Universiteit at Amsterdam and the Archives and Documentation Centre of the Reformed Churches at Kampen. Results of their efforts are published in the three above-mentioned volumes, which together consist of 55 articles, mainly dealing with the history of the Reformed Church. Without doubt the most prominent reformed Dutch theologian was Abraham Kuyper. June 1998 the Vrije Universiteit celebrated the occasion that 100 years earlier he delivered his famous Stone Lectures on Calvinism at Princeton University. Fond of America as he was, this was one of the finest moments of Kuyper's life. *Kuyper Reconsidered* gathers the lectures given at this symposium. The papers presented evaluate Kuyper's influence on the course of history and his relevance for some of today's issues.

As it is impossible to discuss all 26 articles in *Kuyper Reconsidered* within the scope of this review I will pay most attention to Kuyper's influence outside Europe. Whereas in the Netherlands the role of "Abraham the Magnificent" seems over and done with, in the United States, South Africa, Korea, and Japan his work is still intensively studied. Korean Bong Ho Son uses the concept of sphere sovereignty to contribute to the debate on the boundaries of state influence on society, while the American Nicholas Wolterstorff regards it as an important contribution to solving the tension between democracy and religious minorities. Philosopher Van der Walt discusses the relevance of Kuyper's opening lecture at the Christelijk Sociaal Congres of 1891 for one of South Africa's major problems: poverty. His Japanese colleague, Hisakazu Inagaki, uses two key concepts of Kuyper's theology, palingenesis and common-grace, to present an evaluation of Japanese Zen Buddhism. All in all, parts of Kuyper's legacy seem still very much alive.

A part of Kuyper's heritage that is more troublesome is his racism, and the legacy it left behind particularly in South Africa. D.Th. Kuiper compares Kuyper's ideas on this subject with those of his predecessor as political leader of the Calvinist part of the Dutch nation, Groen van Prinsterer. Strangely, the aristocrat Groen argued more against racism than the populist Kuyper. This mainly had to do with Kuyper's positive view of the South African Boers, whom he regarded as guardians of the old and true Dutch Calvinist values. His partiality in their conflict with the British and the blacks blinded his view to the cruel treatment which some Boers meted out to their black servants. But Kuyper's racism was not just circumstantial, it was also founded on his theology. He referred to the curse of Cham as an explanation for what he considered as the low level of black civilization. The South African theologians Totius and Treurnicht used Kuyper's idea of organic development of creation and the thesis that every race ought to follow its own separate road of development to defend the ideology of apartheid. Both Strauss and Adonis evaluate this development in their papers. Their main thesis is that Kuyper himself cannot be considered as the author of an apartheid theology. By focusing on other tendencies in his thought, room is created for a theology that adheres to the reformed confessions but does not condone Apartheid. In this way Kuyperian theology can retain a prominent place in post-apartheid South Africa.

In a volume commemorating the Stone Lectures an article on the influence of Kuyper in the United States cannot be left out. George Harinck reaches the rather disenchanting conclusion that Kuyper's influence was almost non-existent in the main-stream American presbyterian circles in which he held the lectures. His impact on the Dutch immigrant churches was much stronger, but these were marginal in American society.

Breaches and Bridges is the result of a symposium jointly held in November 1998 in Kampen by the Archives and Documentation Centre at Kampen and the Roosevelt Study Centre at Middelburg. The volume explores the multiple backgrounds and effects of the 1834 Secession in the Netherlands, the United States and Germany. The introduction (George Harinck and Hans Krabbendam) is followed by a rather superficial essay by Herman Selderhuis. Far more interesting are the other articles. First, Pieter Stokvis compares the emigration of the Dutch Seceders with other religiously motivated migrations from Europe to the USA in the middle of the nineteenth century. His conclusion is that Dutch Seceders played a far more important role in Dutch emigration than did their counterparts in Germany and Scandinavia.

Jasper Vree and Al Janssen give a description of early nineteenth century main-stream theology in the Dutch Reformed Church in the Netherlands and its counterpart in the United States. Vree's paper – of which a revised reprint is

available on the Internet, “<http://www.vu.nl/hdc/Vree.html>” – focuses on the relationship between the Leiden theology professor Johannes Clarisse and his pupil Albertus van Raalte, later one of the leaders of the emigrated Seceders. The bonds between them partly explain why the first emigrants chose to join the Reformed Church in America and did not found a separate church organization, as would seem probable from a Dutch perspective. Janssen’s article illustrates the same point, but also shows some of the existing tensions and debates within the American Reformed Church that preceded the 1857 secession.

Robert Swieringa and Melis te Velde both focus on the Dutch backgrounds of this secession which led to the founding of the Christian Reformed Church. Van Raalte’s analysis of the Reformed Church in America as being almost completely free from the flaws of its Dutch counterpart was not shared by all American Seceders. However, the new church was not immediately considered the natural counterpart of the Dutch Secession Church. Swieringa’s statistics lead him to the conclusion that the choice for RCA or CRC was more stimulated by one’s regional background than by ecclesiastical affiliation. Even the majority of CRC members had been Dutch Reformed in the Netherlands. It was mainly its character of a church of colonists, not immigrants, that created the strong bond between the CRC and the Dutch Seceders. The breach between the CRC and mainstream-America made it possible for the church to serve as a bridge between the USA and the Netherlands.

Gerrit Jan Beuker describes the emigration of the *Altreformierten* in the German County of Bentheim, while Jelle Faber evaluates the spiritual baggage Dutch secessionist theologians took with them when they crossed the Atlantic. This baggage consisted of the doctrine of infralapsarianism and a strong orientation towards the Reformed confessions at the expense of experiential pietism. These gave the Christian Reformed Church its own character in contrast with the *Gereformeerde Kerken* in the Netherlands, which were far more influenced by Kuiper’s supralapsarist theology.

The last two articles, by Herbert Brinks and George Harinck, introduce two church historians that studied the origins of their Seceded Church, Henry Beets on the Christian Reformed Church and Harm Bouwman on the years following the 1834 Secession.

Without doubt Robert Swieringa is the dean of Dutch-American Studies. Especially the compilation of immigrant statistics and his many books and articles on the religious aspects of Dutch migration to the USA are outstanding contributions to this area of research. *The Dutch-American Experience* therefore is a well-deserved tribute by his colleagues to this eminent historian.

After a biographical essay and a bibliography of Swieringa, Hans Krabbendam explores the question whether a critical attitude towards the strong bond between the Netherlands Reformed church and the state in the Netherlands was

a reason for the Seceders to go to the United States with its strict division between church and state. His conclusion is that the Seceders who stressed most the identity of the Seceded Church with the Reformed Church of the Dutch Republic, generally stayed in the Netherlands, while those with a more cosmopolitan outlook, like Van Raalte and Scholte, went to the USA. Interesting is the essay by Janel Curry on the relation between the Dutch Calvinist world view and the organization of agricultural communities in the American Midwest. She puts forward the thesis that the Calvinist ideas concerning nature and society resulted in a less profit-oriented way of farming. The stress on a balance between man and nature and on communal values gave Dutch farming communities a different look from those inhabited by German Lutherans or American Quakers. Pieter Stokvis writes about the less known emigration of Dutch Socialists, while Suzanne Sinke compares the role of women in the Dutch emigrant communities in the USA and the Dutch East Indies. She comes to the conclusion that the already existing differences of perception of class and gender between higher and middle class women going to the Indies and lower and middle class women leaving for America were intensified by the migration.

Brian Beltman describes in a lengthy article the small exodus of Dutch inhabitants from Pella during the American Civil War. This was an effort to escape conscription into military service and to resist the increasing urge to integrate in the American surroundings. Yda Schreuder focusses on the assimilation of Roman Catholic Dutch settlements in Wisconsin. She argues that this assimilation was the result of geographical factors and less of church ideology. The farming colonies which were founded by Dutch Calvinists were an exception in the history of American immigration. North-Brabant post-World War II emigration is assessed by the late Henk van Stekelenburg. His conclusion is that in these years the emigration pattern differed from earlier emigration waves characterized by group migration.

Donald Luidens and Roger Nemeth present statistical data about the effects of Dutch immigration between 1830 and 1920, based on membership figures and geographical distribution of the Reformed Church in America. We are not presented with an analysis of the influence of the new migrants on theology and mentality of this long existing American church. Richard Harms gives a short introduction to the early history of the Christian Reformed Church in America. He concentrates on the effects of ongoing immigration on forging the identity of the young church.

The last section of this book is a portrait gallery including two ministers, a theology professor, the writer Hendrik van Loon, and the Goustra family in Chicago. The preponderance of the clergy stresses once again their importance as leaders of the Dutch immigrant colonies. James Bratt's biography of Lammert Hulst illustrates that even in the CRC conservative patriarchs like

Hulst in the end had to accept that their congregations became more American and less Dutch, although this development was slower in the CRC than in the RCA. A similar story is told by Earl Kennedy in his paper on RCA minister Egbert Winter. His career was troubled by the fierce controversy in the RCA about the legitimacy of masonic membership for church members. Not only did this lead to troublesome relations within the RCA, but a large number of immigrants in the Midwest left the RCA to join the CRC. The professor introduced by George Harinck is Geerhardus Vos, who introduced Kuyper's Neocalvinism at Princeton. As a young and brilliant theologian, he became teacher at Calvin Theological Seminary even before serving a congregation. His switch to Princeton proved a gateway for Kuyper to the core of American theology, although Neocalvinism did not become rooted in American soil, until after World War II.

Together these three volumes give a good insight in the state of the art of Dutch-American studies, the diversity of the themes explored and the variety of sources available for further study.

Guus Boone

Jan Smelik, *Eén in lied en leven. Het stichtelijk lied bij Nederlandse protestanten tussen 1866 en 1938*. Den Haag: SDU, 1997, xii, 516 pp., ISBN 90-12-08517-9, f 49,50.

Deze dissertatie kwam tot stand in het kader van het project Nederlandse cultuur in Europese context. De belangrijkste thema's zijn de plaats van de liederen binnen het verzuilde Nederland, de verspreiding van stichtelijke liederen en het lied als middel tot overdracht van normen en waarden.

Hoewel het boek handelt over de liedcultuur in Nederland speelt de zending toch een belangrijke rol. Het vijfde hoofdstuk handelt namelijk over de plaats van het lied in Nederlandse zendingsbeweging. Hierbij komen zowel de liederenbladen van verschillende zendingsfeesten als de diverse zendingsliederenbundels aan bod.

Opvallend is de rol die de zendingsfeesten hebben gespeeld bij de herinstructie van de liederen van de zeventiende-eeuwse Veenlandse dichter Adriaen Valerius. Deze geestelijke liederen uit de tijd van de Opstand pasten met hun sterk nationaal karakter blijkbaar uitstekend bij een zendingsopvatting waarin bekering en nationale expansie hand in hand gingen. Vooral in orthodox-protestantse kring werden ze veel gebruikt.

Dat de zendingsorganisaties hun beschavende activiteiten niet alleen tot overzee beperkten blijkt uit de samenstelling van zendingsliederenbundels door de Zendings-Studie-Raad te 's-Gravenhage. Deze werden geïntroduceerd met het expliciete doel om de kwaliteit van het zingen op zendingsbijeenkomsten te

verbeteren, zowel in inhoudelijke zin wat betreft de thematiek van de teksten, als in esthetische zin wat betreft de melodiekeuze en poëtische kwaliteit van de liederen. Wat dat betreft werden de Nederlandse zangers dus niet echt heel anders benaderd dan bijvoorbeeld de Javaanse. In dit verband rees bij mij de vraag of de J. Kats die in *Stemmen voor Waarheid en Vrede* uitvoerig over de aan kerkmuziek te stellen eisen schreef, niet dezelfde is als de leider van de kweekschool te Modjowarno, die zich bezighield met de ontwikkeling van de zang in de Javaanse christengemeenten.

Al met al biedt Smeliks proefschrift een aantal aardige inkijkjes in de ideeënwereld van zowel de zendingsorganisaties als van de vele gulle gevers die het zendingswerk mogelijk maakten.

Guus Boone

Henri van der Zee, *'s Heeren slaaf. Het dramatische leven van Jacobus Capitein*. Amsterdam: Balans, 2000, 176 pp., ISBN 90-5018-514-2, f 34,90.

De achttiende-eeuwse neger-predikant Jacobus Eliza Johannes Capitein blijft boeien. Alleen al het zien van zijn portret met weelderige zwarte pruik en toga laat een tamelijk onwerkelijk gevoel achter. Maar vooral is er de paradox van de ex-slaaf die in een publieke dissertatie de slavernij verdedigt. Voeg hierbij nog het feit dat hij de eerste zwarte protestantse geestelijke was, de terugkeer naar zijn geboortegrond, de Goudkust, als gemeentepredikant, maar vooral als zendeling, en de tragische afloop van zijn leven, een vroege dood met achterlating van niet alleen een jonge echtgenote maar ook een groot aantal schulden, en de stof voor een roman als Guus Kuijers *De redder van Afrika* ligt klaar. Henri van der Zee laat echter in dit uiterst leesbare boek zien dat ook zonder romantisering de geschiedenis van Capitein de aandacht kan blijven vasthouden.

Guus Boone

Gerrit Jan Beuker, *Abgeschiedenes Streben nach Einheit. Leben und Wirken Henricus Beukers, 1834-1900*. Bentheim: Hellendoorn/Kampen: Mondiss, 1996, 416 pp., ISBN 3-929013-13-4, f 35,-.

Deze Kamper dissertatie (Oudestraat) handelt over het leven van Henricus Beuker, een Duitse christelijk-gereformeerde predikant, die uiteindelijk naar de Verenigde Staten emigreerde. Zijn achternaamgenoot – maar geen familielid – G.J. Beuker, de toonaangevende kenner van de geschiedenis van de bij de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland aangesloten Alt-Reformierte Kirche in

Bentheim en Ostfriesland, beschrijft systematisch en grondig de levensloop van Beuker.

Henricus Beuker was een van de minder bekende predikanten van de tweede generatie afgescheidenen. Hij was vooral een goed organisator die zich zowel voor het Christelijk-Gereformeerd onderwijs als voor filantropische instellingen (het doveninstituut Effatha) inzette. Daarnaast behoorde hij regelmatig tot het moderamen van de Generale Synode van de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk en was hij de oprichter en jarenlang hoofdredacteur van het Christelijk-Gereformeerde tijdschrift *De Vrije Kerk*. Dit bood langere en meer diepgaande artikelen dan de bestaande kerkbladen *De Bazuin* en *De Wekstem*.

Beuker werd het bekendst door zijn optreden in de jaren tussen de Doleantie van 1886 en de Vereniging van 1892. Hiervoor werd hij door Kuyper met kritiek overladen omdat hij het samengaan van Christelijk-Gereformeerden en dolerenden zou tegenhouden. G.J. Beuker laat zien dat Henricus Beuker juist relatief positief over een vereniging was, maar wel eerst heel helder wilde hebben dat de dolerenden zich ook hadden afgescheiden van de Hervormde Kerk – en daarmee de rechtmatigheid van de Afscheiding van 1834 erkenden – voordat de kerkelijke eenwording serieus overwogen kon worden.

Voor de lezers van ons Documentatieblad zijn de hoofdstukken 12 tot en met 16 over de Amerikaanse periode van Beuker het meest relevant. Ook hier werkte Beuker mee aan verschillende pogingen van de Christian Reformed Church om samen te gaan met andere kerken van presbyteriaanse richting, maar de verschillen tussen de Nederlandse emigranten en de Amerikaanse kerken bleken uiteindelijk te groot om volledige samensmelting mogelijk te maken. Hoewel hij in 1893 gekomen was als gemeentepredikant van Muskegon werd hij al snel benoemd als docent aan de theologische school, Calvin Seminary. In 1894 nam hij, na een tweede verzoek daartoe, deze benoeming aan. Ook in de Verenigde Staten was hij mede-oprichter van een blad, *De gereformeerde Amerikaan*.

Doordat Henricus Beuker steeds midden in het kerkelijk leven stond, of dat nu de Altreformierte Kirche, de Christelijk-Afgescheiden Kerk, de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk of de Christian Reformed Church was, biedt dit proefschrift tegelijk een goed beeld van de ontwikkelingen binnen deze kerkgenootschappen in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw. Duidelijk wordt de internationale uitstraling die een toch klein kerkgenootschap als de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk kon hebben.

Guus Boone

J.W. Deenick (ed.), *A Church en Route: 40 Years Reformed Churches of Australia*. Reformed Churches Publishing House, Geelong (Vic.) 1991. xii, 280 pp., index, bibliography. ISBN 0 9590727 7 2.

After World War II many immigrants from the Netherlands arrived in Australia. Most of them joined the Presbyterian Church and eventually the Uniting Church which came into being in 1977 as a result of a union between Methodists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists. The *Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland* (GKN) initially advised its members to join the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia (the Free Presbyterians). However, the strictness of this Church in matters of worship (singing of psalms only, without instrumental accompaniment) caused many of the newcomers not to feel at home there and eventually they founded churches of their own, first in Tasmania (1951). Today, the membership of the Reformed Churches of Australia (RCA) is more than 9,000, with more than 50 congregations. In 1954 the RCA founded a Reformed Theological College at Geelong. The church is not to be confused with the Free Reformed Churches of Australia, the first of which was founded at the same time as the RCA by immigrants who were members of the Reformed Churches (Liberated) in the Netherlands.

The four chapters of Part I of this celebration volume relate the history of the RCA up to 1991. Part II gives an account of church activities, from worship to theological education. Part III describes the RCA's external relations in mission work (Indonesia, Pacific islands), evangelism, ecumenical relations, schools and mass media. The last chapter concludes that, were history to repeat itself, the RCA should be founded again, and looks ahead into the future of the church.

The volume is amply illustrated and contains a number of boxes with biographical sketches of church personalities, including 'Klaas and Riek Runia'. Nevertheless, it is not a popular family history. The authors endeavour to portray the spiritual pilgrimage of the Dutch immigrants and their descendants. The picture which results is not that of an overseas church whose members have simply stopped developing when leaving the old country, rigidly maintaining the positions abandoned long ago by the mother church. True, the 'decline in several important ways' of the Dutch *Gereformeerde Kerken* (GKN) is deplored (69). In matters doctrinal the RCA leaders consider G.C. Berkouwer's theology as normative (it can hardly be coincidental that the first volume of Berkouwer's *Dogmatische Studiën* was published in 1949, two years before the RCA was founded). What happened after Berkouwer was rejected, making RCA members wonder whether their church might be going the same way. However, the church, like most Dutch immigrants in Australia, has quickly adapted to the new circumstances. The last church service in Dutch was held in 1985; a number of born Australians have joined the church. The ensuing encounter with the Australian environment has resulted in discussions and changes of another kind. In Australia, Protestantism is much more varied than in the Netherlands where 95% of the Protestant believers belong to a church of the Reformed type. People adhering to doctrinal orthodoxy mostly are of the

Evangelical or Pentecostal type. As a result, debates center on matters of lifestyle (the Australian brethren in the faith keeping a close watch on smoking and drinking and being less strict on Sunday observance) and worship. Rather than mirroring the image of the GKN as it was half a century ago, the RCA is developing dynamics of its own, which in the end will make it a truly Australian church. At least, that is the impression produced by this beautiful volume.

Th. van den End

Twee blijde boodschappers. Brieven uit Bada van Jacob en Elisabeth Woensdregt, 1916-1928, bijeengebracht en toegelicht door Nol Kraan. Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, Zoetermeer, 2000, 307 pp.; illustraties, kaartje, bibliografie. ISBN 90 239 0688 8, prijs NLG 49.50.

Jacob Woensdregt (1889-1928) en zijn vrouw Elisabeth Hoornweg (1887-1967) woonden, met een onderbreking voor verlof, van 1915 tot 1928 als zendelingsechtpaar in Midden-Celebes. Het grootste deel van die tijd waren zij werkzaam als pionier-zendingen in het afgelegen landschap Bada, ten westen van het Posso-meer. Jacob was een goed waarnemer, die zich een behoorlijke kennis verwierf van religie en cultuur van de To Bada en deze beschreef in een aantal uitgaven, waarvan de meeste postuum verschenen. De Hervormde classis Deventer, die hem had uitgezonden, had een eigen zendingsblad, de *Bada-bode*. Voor dit blad schreef Van Woensdregt (soms ook zijn vrouw) regelmatig verslagen van zijn werk, waarin hij op levendige wijze de leefwereld van de To Bada en hun reactie op de christelijke boodschap beschreef. Hun dochter Catharina Elisabeth (overleden 1995) en haar echtgenoot A.E. Kraan hebben deze voor een groter publiek bestemde brieven in boekvorm uitgegeven, samen met een dagboek dat Elisabeth in 1927 gedurende twee maanden bijhield en dat eveneens voor de *Bada-bode* bestemd was. Aan deze documenten zijn toegevoegd fragmenten uit de overige in druk verschenen geschriften van Woensdregt en toelichtende hoofdstukken over geografie, sociale en culturele aspecten, zending en andere godsdiensten, die in hoofdzaak citaten bieden uit geschriften van Adriani, Kruyt en Kraemer. Het geheel wordt afgesloten door biografische gegevens over Jacob en Elisabeth Woensdregt, met aan het einde de tekst van het uitvoerige In Memoriam door A.C. Kruyt.

De brieven van Woensdregt bieden in de eerste plaats interessante details over hemzelf. Hij is een leerling van de Nederlandse Zendingsschool, en een medewerker van Kruyt en Adriani. Daarbij horen belangstelling en respect voor de mensen onder wie de zending werkt. Maar bij Woensdregt, die op zeventienjarige leeftijd in een opwekkingsbijeenkomst was geroepen tot het zendingswerk, vinden wij ook de piëtistische laag. In zijn brieven treffen

wij de woorden ‘zonde’ en ‘zondebesef’ nog aan, die in die periode uit het vocabulaire van de Nederlandse zending aan het verdwijnen waren (115, 146, 174). Voor hem is christen-woorden primair de verlossing van vrees (38), de losmaking uit gebondenheid (69). Wij treffen in deze brieven eveneens enkele beschrijvingen aan van een sterfbed, zij het ook dat ze soberder gehouden zijn dan in het algemeen in de piëtistische zending het geval was (93, 143). Rampen en tegenspoed zijn stemmen van God (107v). Over ‘beschaving’ en ‘beschaven’ als taak van de zending horen wij daarentegen nauwelijks iets, in ieder geval niet op directe wijze. Wat niet wil zeggen dat de zendeling geen oordeel heeft over bepaald zeden en gewoonten van de To Bada. Hij en zijn vrouw gruwen van de wijze waarop bij bepaalde feesten de offerdieren worden omgebracht en hebben (beiden waren verplegers van beroep geweest) nogal wat aan te merken op de wijze waarop de To Bada hun zieken verzorgen. Zij zijn kritischer over de rol van de adel dan in de Posso-zending gebruikelijk was (127, 134, 190). Echter, zoals gezegd, over het algemeen is de rapportage vervuld van respect. Daardoor kan Woensdregt ook nuchter zijn over de motieven waarom de mensen Christen worden, en kan hij er begrip voor opbrengen als zij het niet worden (54, 62, 127-130, 164). Dat laatste was bij negentiende-eeuwse zendelingen wel eens anders geweest! Wij horen over de rol van dromen (73, 84, 117, 183-186) en over de proefnemingen waarmee mensen heel ‘rationeel’ de risico’s van een overgang uitproberen. Over syncretistische verschijnselen (129). Over de omzetting van oude feesten in nieuwe, christelijke (129, 145). Over de invloed van het Christendom op het huwelijk (139). Kortom, over het ontstaan van een christelijke samenleving. Van Woensdregt vertelt hierover op onderhoudende wijze, met talrijke details, maar zonder het soms wat hinderlijke interpretatieve kader dat zijn collega Kruyt eromheen placht te zetten. Het is zeer te betreuren dat dit fraaie brievenmateriaal is uitgegeven zonder registers (zelfs geen personenregister). Gezien de vele reisbeschrijvingen zou een goed overzichtskaartje van Midden-Celebes ook geen luxe zijn geweest. De toelichtende hoofdstukken bevatten nogal eens herhalingen; het ware beter geweest als de inhoud kort was samengevat in een Inleiding en een wat uitvoeriger annotatie dan nu geboden wordt. Dat geldt natuurlijk het meest voor de biografische gegevens betreffende de beide hoofdpersonen. Al met al: een waardevolle brievenverzameling, die nog beter tot haar recht was gekomen als ze op een professionelere wijze was bewerkt.

Th. van den End.

Berichten

Het archief van de Protestantse Kerk in Nederlands-Indië (Th. van den End)
Zoals bekend verondersteld mag worden, nam in 1844 een in Batavia gevestigd Kerkbestuur de leiding van de Protestantse gemeenten in Nederlands-Indië over van de Bataviase kerkenraad, die tot dan toe als een soort centraal college had gefungeerd. Tot in de jaren vijftig van de twintigste eeuw bestond dit Kerkbestuur geheel of gedeeltelijk uit Nederlanders, terwijl ook een aanzienlijk deel van de gemeenten Nederlandstalig was. Doordat de Protestantse Kerk nauw met de koloniale overheid verbonden was en ressorteerde onder het Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst, werden de archieven gedeponereerd in het Landsarchief, het huidige *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (ANRI). In 1935 echter werd de administratieve scheiding van kerk en staat doorgevoerd. Vanaf die tijd vormde het bestuur een eigen archief. Bij een bezoek in Jakarta in de jaren tachtig trof dr Th. van den End dit archief in deplorabele staat aan. Met medeweten en instemming van het toenmalige Kerkbestuur (intussen *Pengurus Gereja Protestan di Indonesia* geheten) en in overleg met de directie van het Arsip Nasional nam hij maatregelen om het voor verder verval te behoeden. Hij vervaardigde tevens een plaatsingslijst, waardoor het toegankelijk werd gemaakt voor onderzoekers. Meerderen, Nederlanders en Indonesiërs, hebben er sindsdien van gebruik gemaakt.

Dit jaar bleek, dat het archief opnieuw in de gevarezone was beland. Het kantoor van de *Pengurus* GPI is krap bemeten en een van de bestuursleden creëerde ruimte door het archief in rijstzakken te stoppen. Weliswaar maakte een ander bestuurslid deze maatregel weer ongedaan, maar voor herhaling moest worden gevreesd. Bovendien zijn sinds enkele jaren christelijke gebouwen niet meer veilig, ook niet in Jakarta. Daarom leek het dr Van den End wenselijk dat het archief naar een andere lokatie overgebracht zou worden. De voorzitter van de GPI, ds D.J. Lumenta, was het hiermee eens. Het *Arsip Nasional* was gaarne bereid het archief een plaats te geven in zijn magazijnen. Op 25 juli j.l. vond de officiële overdracht plaats en werd het archief naar de gebouwen van het ANRI aan de Jalan Ampera Raya in Jakarta-Zuid getransporteerd.

Het archief van de GPI is het belangrijkste kerkelijke archief in Indonesië voor de periode na 1800. Het bevat stukken uit de periode 1820-1960. Ruggengraat zijn de zeer uitvoerige notulen van het Kerkbestuur van 1844 tot 1950. Helaas is uit de periode 1898-1927 een aantal delen verdwenen. Prof. dr P.D. Latuihamallo, van de Theologische Hogeschool aan de Jalan Proklamasi, vertelt als student in 1942 gezien te hebben hoe na de komst van de Japanners het personeel van het kantoor van de PK deze jaargangen als pindapapier verkocht. Voorts zijn er notulen van kerkelijke vergaderingen voorafgaand aan de vorming van de Protestantse Kerk in 1844 en aan de administratieve scheiding

van 1935, diaconale stukken uit de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw, kerkeradsnotulen van de gemeente te Serang (1855-1927), correspondentie tussen het Kerkbestuur en de afzonderlijke gemeenten (met zeer veel stukken uit de periode 1942-1945), correspondentie met wat destijds de autonome deelkerken van de PK in Oost-Indonesië waren (Minahassa, Molukken, Timor) en stukken betreffende andere onderdelen van de kerkelijke organisatie: predikanten en inlands leraars, maatschappelijke arbeid, publiciteit, relaties met andere kerken en met de overheid.

Nu dit archief aan de collectie van het ANRI is toegevoegd, is dit met het Algemeen Rijksarchief in Den Haag en het Archief van de Raad voor de Zending de belangrijkste vindplaats voor documenten betreffende de geschiedenis van kerk en zending in Nederlands-Indië/Indonesië. In het ANRI staan nu de notulen van het centrale kerkelijke bestuur in de Nederlandse bezittingen in Zuidoost-Azië tussen 1621 en 1950! Specifieke onderwerpen waarover het archief veel materiaal biedt zijn: de religieuze geschiedenis van de Nederlandstalige gemeenschap in Nederlands-Indië, de relatie tussen kerk en koloniale overheid, de Japanse tijd, de zending in bepaalde gebieden.

Het moet worden betreurd dat, door de overbrenging naar het ANRI, het GPI-archief minder toegankelijk is geworden, althans voor niet-Indonesiërs. Zij hebben een speciaal onderzoeksvisum nodig, dat slechts is te verkrijgen na een tijdrovende procedure bij het LIPI (de Indonesische Academie van Wetenschappen). Het ligt echter in de bedoeling het archief afdoende te inventariseren en vervolgens geheel te microfilmen. Nu reeds zijn microfilms beschikbaar van de belangrijkste gedeelten van het archief, o.m. van de notulen Kerkbestuur. De middelen hiervoor werden beschikbaar gesteld door de Raad voor de Zending resp. de Dienst MDO van de SoW-kerken.

Enkele mededelingen betreffende de voortgang van het Sint-Petersburg-project (Th.J.S. van Staalduine)

Reeds enkele jaren onderzoekt een team onder leiding van prof. P.N. Holtrop te Kampen de geschiedenis van de Hollandse Hervormde Kerk te Sint-Petersburg. Een eerste resultaat van dit onderzoek zag op 15 januari j.l. het licht, toen de bundel: P.N. Holtrop e.a., *Hervormd in Sint-Petersburg. Verkenningen van de geschiedenis van de Hollandse Hervormde Kerk in Sint-Petersburg 1717-1927*, werd gepresenteerd. Hoofddoel van het project is de publicatie, op CD-Rom en in boekvorm, van een collectie bronnen, voornamelijk afkomstig uit het archief van de kerk. Dit archief wordt nu bewaard in het Centrale Staats Historische Archief van Sint-Petersburg (de ietwat misleidende officiële naam van het gemeentearchief van Sint-Petersburg tot 1917).

Maar ook op andere plaatsen bleken waardevolle aanvullingen voor de bronnenpublicatie aanwezig. Zo werden in het afgelopen jaar stukken betreffende de overdracht van het kerkgebouw in de jaren '20 aan de

stadsoverheid ontdekt in het archief van de dienst voor Monumentenzorg in Sint-Petersburg. Andere archivalia van na de Revolutie van 1917 bevinden zich in het zgn. Sowjet-archief (de instelling waar de archivalia betreffende stad en regio Leningrad/Sint-Petersburg van na 1917 worden bewaard). Een interessante periode uit de nadagen van de kerk bleek hier goed gedocumenteerd aanwezig. Het betreft de z.g. Jezus Christus-gemeente, die als protestantse Russischtalige gemeente het kerkgebouw huurde sinds 1924. Het gaat hierbij om meer dan een verwante organisatie. Deze Jezus Christus-gemeente bestond uit nazaten van de lutherse en gereformeerde kerken van Sint-Petersburg, die op deze wijze een spirituele doorstart probeerden te maken. Een spannende vraag voor ons project is hoeveel nazaten van Nederlandse leden van de oude Hollandse gemeente de weg naar deze gemeente hebben gevonden.

Een heel andere vondst betrof het overheidsdossier in het Russische Staats Historische Archief (het nationaal archief, eveneens slechts voor de periode tot 1917) te Sint-Petersburg betreffende ds W.L. Welter (vader van de latere hofprediker), aangelegd in verband met het (uitgevoerde) voornemen hem een Russische onderscheiding toe te kennen.

In de geschiedschrijving staat de Hollandse Kerk te boek als gesticht in 1717, als afsplitsing van de Lutherse Kerk. Het bleek nuttig om ook een blik te slaan in de voorafgaande periode. In het archief van de Lutherse Kerk van Sint-Petersburg werd een boekhouding uit het jaar 1711 aangetroffen in het Nederlands! En uit 1713 werden in het Algemeen Rijksarchief te Den Haag brieven gevonden aan de Staten-Generaal met het verzoek om ondersteuning om een eigen kerk op te richten. Uit 'nootsaak' werden de kinderen wel gedoopt en gecatechiseerd door de 'Leuyterse' predikanten, maar men vreest toch, aldus deze brief, dat ze van 't waare saligmaakende geloof' zullen 'afraaken'. De oecumene avant-la-lettre ging duidelijk nog niet van harte!

In het afgelopen jaar kwam collegiale samenwerking tot stand met het Nederlands Russisch Archief Centrum te Groningen. Het Algemeen Rijksarchief heeft aan de Rijks-Universiteit Groningen de inventarisatie gedelegeerd van alle archivalia in Rusland die betrekking hebben op Nederland. Dit project wordt uitgevoerd onder leiding van dr J.S.A.M. van Koningsbrugge en is in 2000 van start gegaan.

Voorts heeft drs B. Woelderink, archivaris van het Koninklijk Huisarchief, het initiatief genomen tot het organiseren van een tentoonstelling over de geschiedenis van de Hollandse kerk in Sint-Petersburg en haar leden. Deze zal plaatsvinden in september 2001, in het gebouw van de voormalige kerk, Nevski Prospect 20 te Sint-Petersburg. Het ligt in de bedoeling deze tentoonstelling vervolgens ook in Nederland te exposeren. Het Kamper Sint-Petersburg-project participeert in de organisatie.

Mededelingen uit de Werkgroep

In het afgelopen halfjaar kwamen bestuur en redactie van de werkgroep eenmaal bijeen. Een algemene ledenvergadering werd niet gehouden. Dat de werkgroep desondanks niet heeft stilgezeten moge onder meer blijken uit het feit dat ook dit nummer van DZOK redelijk op tijd verschijnt.

In het vorige nummer werd meegedeeld dat dr H.E. Niemeijer, lid van de redactie van DZOK en mede-uitvoerder van het Molukkenproject, een benoeming gekregen had als coördinator van het TANAP-project. Helaas is deze benoeming voor hem aanleiding geweest zich terug te trekken uit de redactie van ons tijdschrift. Wij danken hem voor wat hij in de afgelopen jaren voor de Werkgroep en voor DZOK heeft betekend. De redactie beraadt zich op aanvulling met nieuwe leden.

Het Molukkenproject blijft goede voortgang maken. Het ziet er naar uit dat reeds volgend jaar de eerste delen in druk kunnen verschijnen. De inhoud is en blijft helaas actueel. Wij hebben intussen vernomen dat bij de aanvallen op de Campus van de UKIM, op 22 juni en volgende dagen, de daar berustende archieven niet verloren zijn gegaan. Een van de docenten had ze tevoren in veiligheid gebracht. Ook de bibliotheek van de theologische faculteit, met vele kostbare werken over de geschiedenis van de Molukken en de Molukse kerk, is gespaard.

Personalia

Rita Smith Kipp is the Rob Oden Professor of Anthropology at Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio (USA). She is the author of *The Early Years of a Dutch Colonial Mission: the Karo Field* (1990), and *Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian Society* (1993).

Azyumardi Azra is Professor of History and Rector of IAIN (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*/State Institute for Islamic Studies), Jakarta.

Dr Simon Rae (1940) is Principal of the School of Ministry, Knox College, Dunedin, New Zealand, and an associate lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies in the University of Otago. His research interests are in medieval and modern history and mission studies. From 1972-1978 he served with the *Gereja Batak Karo Protestan*, firstly as a university chaplain in Bandung and later as an exchange minister in North Sumatra. He has served general and Chinese congregations in New Zealand, and was joint Methodist-Presbyterian mission secretary 1984-1989.

Dr Th. van den End (1940), is zendingspredikant van de NHK (GZB). Hij was van 1970 tot 1981 werkzaam aan de Theologische Hogeschool in Jakarta als docent kerkhistorische vakken. Hij verzorgde o.a. een driedelige bronnenpublicatie over de geschiedenis van de protestantse zending in Indonesië. Dr van den End is lid van de redactie van DZOK.

WERKGROEP VOOR DE GESCHIEDENIS VAN DE
NEDERLANDSE ZENDING EN OVERZEESE KERKEN

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Dr A.Th. Boone

Dr Chr.G.F. de Jong

Dr H. Reenders

De Werkgroep, opgericht in 1993 en op 5 januari 1994 als Stichting ingeschreven in het register van de Kamer van Koophandel te Zwolle (S. 24969), is gevestigd te Kampen. De werkgroep stelt zich ten doel het stimuleren van wetenschappelijk onderzoek op het gebied van de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zending en overzeese kerken. Zij tracht dat doel te bereiken door het organiseren van wetenschappelijke bijeenkomsten en door de uitgave van het *Documentatieblad voor de Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Zending en Overzeese Kerken*.

The Society was founded in 1993 and incorporated by act of legislature January 5th, 1994. The Society has its seat at Kampen (the Netherlands). By holding meetings and by publishing the Documentatieblad (The Journal) The Society pursues the research of the history of Dutch missions and (former Dutch) overseas churches.

Kopij-aanwijzingen

Artikelen en andere bijdragen dienen geadresseerd te worden aan de secretaris van de Redactie van het *Documentatieblad*. Artikelen worden persklaar ingewacht, op diskette (IBM compatible, 3.5", MS-DOS, bij voorkeur WP 6.1 voor Windows of hoger) vergezeld van een exemplaar van de gedrukte tekst. Manuscripten mogen een lengte van 8000 woorden niet overschrijden, voetnoten niet meegerekend. Voorzover in het Nederlands aangeboden dienen manuscripten te worden uitgevoerd volgens de regels, gegeven in P. de Buck, *Zoeken en schrijven. Handleiding bij het maken van een historisch werkstuk* (Haarlem 1982), Hoofdstuk IV (De vormgeving). De auteur dient zijn artikel vergezeld te doen gaan van een samenvatting in het Engels van maximaal 15 regels en, indien hij/zij nog niet eerder in *DZOK* publiceerde, van een beknopt curriculum vitae.

De Redactie aanvaardt geen manuscripten die reeds (of ook) elders ter publicatie zijn aangeboden. Aanvaarding van een manuscript ter publicatie in het *Documentatieblad* betekent dat de auteur het artikel niet elders zal plaatsen zonder voorafgaande toestemming van de Redactie. De Redactie is niet verplicht ongevraagd toegezonden boeken te (doen) bespreken. De Redactie behoudt zich het recht voor ten behoeve van de duidelijkheid en/of consistentie van de aangeboden tekst kleine veranderingen aan te brengen.

Manuscripts not exceeding twenty-five pages, including footnotes and accompanied by disc. IBM compatible (preferably WP 6.1 or 7 for Windows) and books for review should be sent to the Editors of the Journal.

© Stichting Werkgroep voor de Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Zending en Overzeese Kerken, te Kampen.

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